



Adharchandra Mookerjee Lectures for 1940

SOME MODERN TRENDS
IN THE
EVOLUTION OF HUMAN
INSTITUTIONS

BY
PRAPHULLACHANDRA BASU,
M.A., Ph.D., LL.D.



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INTRODUCTORY

Man is a gregarious animal and except in rare instances and under exceptional circumstances, usually lives in organised society. In this way are established contacts between man and man and between one group of men and another. Such contacts may lead to clashes of self-interest which may develop into conflicts. Conflicts, if deep-rooted or abiding, may lead to hostility of one group of men towards another or among individuals of the same group. Such hostility in its turn may be pursued till one party to the conflict is altogether vanquished and eliminated or it may end in a mutual adjustment by which both the parties to the dispute may have to give up a part of their original ground and live amicably according to the terms of the settlement. Conflicts usually arise out of clash of self-interests. Therefore, if a community has many openings to the career of its members, clashes of interest and therefore conflicts of individuals within that community become less generalised. If a man's opportunities for a career are limited and if in his pursuit in that career he is obstructed, he sees no alternative opening for himself. In such cases he gets embittered and feeling thwarted,

nurses his grievance and the consequent hatred throughout his life. Such hatreds may even develop into blood feuds handed over to other members of the family. But if, on the other hand, he has many alternative openings to a career and if after being baulked in one he succeeds in another, he continues in his new career and in its pre-occupations, soon forgets or at least takes less seriously the original conflict which compelled him to resign the first line of approach to a career. Where social opportunities are many and social contacts are less rigid as in towns, conflicts do not so easily develop into hatreds since the individual can avoid those whom he dislikes and cultivate the friendship of others whom he may like. One reason why any sudden or revolutionary change in the social order raises a large number of conflicts is that the old adjustment, in terms of which people lived and found the satisfaction of their interests, is undermined and in the consequent uncertainty of the situation, new rivalries and new methods of approach are suddenly thrust upon them before they have been able to devise an agreed method of settling their disputes. In such cases conflicts grow up rapidly and may lead to grave, even fatal, consequences.

Conflicts leading to opposition have also their good aspects. When within a homogeneous group

or in a family any expression of hostile or discordant opinion is altogether banned, it soon leads to seething discontent and to a sense of frustration, which would have been blown away if there had been a free and frank ventilation of the injured feeling. Such expressions of hostile opinion have a mollifying effect upon the individuals concerned and a strengthening effect upon the group or the family. Fighting, however, keeps a group strong and united while the removal of all opposition leads to fissiparous tendencies which may ultimately break up the group. Opposition to the British Government in India put in the same camp many groups and individuals who, when they came to power, even to a limited extent, failed to agree as to any method of working together. It is a mistake to suppose that conflicts grow with the number and variety of clashes of interests. This would be so if the lines of opposition in all cases were always the same. But this is rarely so. For example, the age conflict between the old and the young finds divergent cleavage in a society from the race conflict or labour conflict or sex conflict. The members arrayed against one another in one kind of conflict may find themselves on the same side in another kind of conflict. Thus a multiplicity of conflicts, instead of making social cohesion weak, may, by assuaging the bitterness of one another, be

a help towards the stability of the social structure. This argument does not intend to support the extension of social cleavages. For all opposition within a social group dissipates individual energy which might otherwise be more profitably employed in social improvement. Therefore, composing clashes of interests is desirable and necessary. Civilised man has utilised various methods for this purpose. Education and culture is expected to generate tolerance for men of different opinions and ways of living. Removal of all invidious distinctions within the social unit reinforces such tolerance and leads to group co-operation in spite of the existence of incompatibility of divergent views on other problems which may face the same society. For example, competitive sports in the West have successfully harnessed the inherent love for strife among the young and the growing. If conflicts prove too deep for immediate amelioration, man has tried the method of educating the young out of such conflicts so that the original conflicts may disappear after the older generation have lived themselves out. The acerbity of religious strife was thus removed in western Europe and may yet be applied to such conflicts in India, especially in Bengal. The scientific and objective attitude of mind has done a great deal in making severe controversies harmless as conflicts. Freedom of discussion reduces the evils of conflict

by instilling in the minds of those engaged in conflict the fact that there is such a thing as the bar of public opinion to which a friendly appeal can be made. In spite of all these methods applied by man for resolving conflicts it must be confessed that conflict and opposition have persisted in human society and the persistence necessitates a close and dispassionate study of their nature, variety, intensity, and objective in order to make an attempt to discover the adaptation which is possible or at least to study the trend of such adaptation in social life.

Competition may be considered as a kind of social clash but it must be distinguished from conflict in the ordinary sense. Competition is necessary to keep society alert, vigorous, and supple. Its elimination as a social phenomenon, unlike that of conflict, will mean social stagnation. Competition is analogous to conflict in that it also generates rivalry for the same object, the complete success of one party to the contest eliminating the other. But it differs from conflict in that it usually works within certain definite code of conduct which seeks to eliminate the bitterness of defeat and always excludes the idea of inflicting any physical injury to the opponent. The ideal competition is to be found in competitive sports. Competition has been used by man for one great social purpose, *viz.* to assign the place

which an individual is to occupy in the social hierarchy. It has its defects but so far this is the best means which man has been able to discover for the purpose. It is certainly superior to the older method according to which social position used to be determined by the principle of heredity, which can rarely ensure the continued existence of merit or even competence. This machinery of competition can be brought into use according to the fluidity of the social organisation. If social positions are fixed by heredity or on any other principle, there can be little scope for competition. The greater the fluidity of social life, that is, the greater the uncertainty of the lines of division among the various occupations within a group, the greater will be the scope for competition for settling the destiny of the individual members of that group. We can see the working of the principle of competition in our own society if we compare our social system fifty years ago with what it is to-day. With the gradual break-up of the old hierarchies based on castes and occupations competition has come more and more into the field. Competition again may be between individuals or it may be between institutions. We are all familiar with individual competition. The lawyer, the physician, the business man, the labourer are competing with their compeers in striving to attain to better

positions in life than the ones from which they started or those which their parents occupied.

Competition among institutions within a country may be severe and may take the form of a real strife. This struggle is usually between institutions which are old and well entrenched and those which are new and hope to give expression to the circumstances arising out of a change in the conditions determining the evolution or existence of social institutions. The first result of such competition is the impulse to destroy or completely eliminate the opponent. This is specially so in the religious and economic spheres, probably also in other spheres if the old institutions, now attacked, have held the field for too long. In the economic sphere this can be seen in the history of labour organisations which challenge the privileges of the employing classes. At one time all attempts at any kind of combination among the working classes were banned. Even to-day such combinations, especially if they adopt any ideological ideal different from that of the governing classes, find great difficulties even in carrying on their other work which may not be directly influenced by their specific ideal. In Bengal the attitude of the land-owning classes towards even the elementary rights of the tenants or of society during the last century shows

this feature in an exaggerated form. Every little instrument of oppressing or mulcting the ryots was contested in every one of the tenancy laws which were enacted. It is also worthy of note that the need for such laws was first felt in Bengal and the U. P. where the zemindari system had been well established. Its attitude towards society was evident from the fact that zemindari incomes of even big landlords could not be subjected to income-tax nor could these be even taken into account in assessing a higher rate for the rest of the incomes of a landlord. In the religious sphere this attitude of one institution to crush its rivals out of existence can be seen in innumerable cases. In the West we see the persecution of Christians in the Roman empire. The Franciscans were persecuted by the Church because they advocated poverty, a principle which clashed with the riches and property of the Roman Church. In India, a land of surprising religious tolerance, Buddhism was eliminated as much by the revivalist aggression of Hinduism as by the Muslim destruction of Buddhist places of culture and learning.

Sometimes an institution which has acquired sufficient privileges for itself attempts to face the onslaughts of competition by withdrawing itself from all competition and remaining beyond the pale of competition in order to defend its

acquired powers and privileges. This is the turn which competition has taken in many spheres of human activity. Thus are the Asiatics excluded from Pacific America, Indians from Africa and Australia and now probably from Burma and Ceylon. In Spain and, for a time, in France the Roman Church adopted this method with State aid to fight its opponents, the reformers. In India the social hierarchy in orthodox Hinduism has tried the same method.

If these methods fail, an institution may reluctantly be compelled to adapt itself to its environment by methods which it never recognised before and which it accepts now only as a means to an end. The best example is the political renovation of Japan in modern times. Neither Japanese culture nor its mystical veneration for monarchy has been affected by the wholesale adoption of Western methods of economic and military organisations. Bismarck's adoption of a comprehensive scheme of social insurance was borrowed by the left-wing Liberals in Britain after a quarter of a century. But Bismarck's object was not to advocate this kind of advance social reform but to deprive the Socialists of Germany of their influence by taking away their main plank of support. An Indian example of such constrained adaptation is the acceptance of the militant programme of the Forward *Bloc*

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by the Congress, thus reducing the very reason for the separate existence of the former.

Sometimes an institution attempts to avoid competition by trying to specialise in a particular line. For years the older universities of Britain tried to evade the demands for scientific studies by asserting that they wanted to specialise in the Classics. The Roman Catholic Church 'specialised' in ritualism to attract and retain its followers and adherents. The Tantric sect in Bengal stood its ground for a long time against the onslaughts of Vaishnava revival by its elaborate and secret mysticism and ceremonials.

The foregoing are all methods adopted by the older institutions in their fight with the newer ones. The method of new institutions must be fundamentally different. They cannot adopt these methods because their adoption presumes an already existing privileged position. Therefore, newer institutions cannot use methods which are mainly devised to keep the ground acquired in the past. For them is not the defensive tactics developed by the older institutions. To begin with, such institutions must start with extravagant and sensational claims which are likely to capture the imagination of the people. They have no past which, in the case of older institutions by their performance, fixes and limits the claims that can be legitimately advanced. They can

promise the millennium because their method is untried and therefore full of imaginary possibilities. People are dissatisfied with the performance of older institutions which, with changed conditions, have not been able to adapt themselves to newer circumstances and therefore have severe critics. These are rallied by the new institutions by promising that the millennium is knocking at the other gate about to be opened by them. Their strongest appeal lies in the demand for freedom from the restraints of the older institutions, which have become palpably irksome in the new circumstances. This slogan for freedom has taken the form of political liberty in subject countries like India, Egypt, the Philippines, and several countries in south-eastern Europe. Further, such institutions sometimes appeal to the mystical bent of mind among the young by having secret and semi-religious ritualism as was seen in the revolutionary organisations of Bengal early in the present century.

From the purely sociological point of view evolutionary adaptation is best fostered by always keeping open the door of competition, thus compelling all institutions to win their followers rather than inherit them. From this point of view any privilege or power allotted to an institution by law or custom is a handicap to itself in the race of life as also a focus-point of

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danger to society later in its history. The bar of public opinion is yet the best judge of institutions in spite of the fact that such opinion may be uninstructed, misled, and even perverse.

SOCIAL CONFLICTS

Turning now to specific items of conflicts in human societies we may discuss some which in modern times have become potent in the life of civilised man. The first that comes to mind just at present is the age conflict or the conflict between the old and the young. We should not be surprised if we find a few young in age among the older group or a few grey-hairs in the fold of youth. It is not merely physical age which determines the two groups in the conflict. Mental age does not necessarily correspond with physical age. Also environment determines the groupings. The young man in comfortable circumstances may well be conservative for the old order has suited him well, while the older man in rags may respond to the call of destructive action. In spite of this cross-mingling of the old and the young there is a fundamental contrast in the outlook between the two which Bacon has thus expressed :

Young men are fitter to invent than to judge, fitter for execution than for counsel, and fitter for new projects than for settled business.

Young men, in the conduct and manage of actions, embrace more than they can hold, stir more than they can quiet ; fly to the end without consideration of the means and degree ; pursue some few principles which they have chanced upon absurdly ; care not to innovate, which draws unknown inconveniences ; use extreme remedies at first ; and, that which doubleth all errors, will not acknowledge or retract them.

Men of age object too much, consult too long, adventure too little, repent too soon, and seldom drive business home to the full period, but content themselves with a mediocrity of success.

The whole outlook of the two parties in the conflict is different. The old have achieved or are on the way to achieving whatever they expect in life. Therefore, their objective is to retain what rights, privileges, or fortunes they have foregathered. This makes them naturally conservative. The young, on the other hand, have ambition but no achievement. They are not content with what they have, for they have little. They want better opportunities and look to the

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prospects of the future rather than to past achievements. Thus they are radical, extreme, and critical of whatever stand in their way. The old may and often do sympathise with the aspirations of the young, for they have tasted the urge in their own youth. But the latter are impatient by nature and not having known the mentality of the old, are hyper-critical of the slow, deliberative attitude of the old.

The acerbity of this conflict between the old and the young has been modified by several factors. The first is the firm place which family life still holds in the minds of all men, young and old. It is less among the young than among the old but none-the-less it exists among the young as well. Within the same family the old and the young live together and in amity. This strong bond of love and affection naturally prevents their fight outside the family from becoming as bitter as many other conflicts or as it might otherwise have been. Another feature is the consideration on the part of the young, especially the leaders among them who are approaching the fold of the older men in physical age, that they would soon be old and be the objective of the conflict within a short time. This moderates their ardour completely to overthrow the old. Also the old become tolerant of the independent attitude of the young as they remember the

dying or dead fires of their younger days. Further, the young among the followers are rarely economically independent and therefore cannot altogether discard the goodwill of the older folks.

Freedom in the abstract which, in years of youthful idealism, has strong fascination for the young, is the usual slogan for them to raise in every sphere of life. Having felt the restraints of rules and conventions against which they protest and thinking that their lot will immediately improve if these are all removed *en bloc*, they are now in a state of revolt all over the world. Interpreted in concrete terms their revolt means a demand for freedom for them to choose, as in India, their mates in marriage or association and to reject any opinions—religious, social, moral, or political—or any code of social conduct except those enjoined or at least approved by themselves. The last war helped the emancipation of youth in the West. In the war, whether at the front or at home, on land, sea, or air, they had taken an active and a dominant part in the serious affairs of life. In spite of the control of older people war is an affair in which, by virtue of their physical strength and suppleness alone if not for other reasons, the young will be in the vanguard and feel that they have achieved great things. In the post-war life of the victorious countries also the young found opportunities

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much greater than in ordinary times. Also the outlook, even among the old, had changed and the younger people did get chances which their forbears in the past had never had. Thus, to a large extent, the young man's desire for control was fulfilled and being saddled with responsibility, he rose to the occasion and quickly attained an amount of sobriety and discipline which led to an understanding between the young and the old who had also been, under war pressure, very much liberalised. Thus the gap between the two groups in the conflict was narrowed down from both sides.

In countries outside the immediate zone of the war the spirit of the young rose to great heights and they became as self-conscious as in the West. But here—in India, China, Egypt—the life of the young was more circumscribed. They were not economically independent. They did not have the same opportunities for control as in the western countries during the war. Neither deaths in war nor post-war expansion had opened up careers to young men at all comparable with what happened in the West. Also the original control of the older people over the young was much greater than in the West. Further, the young had little opportunities of being disciplined and sobered by holding positions of responsibility nor welded together

into a homogeneous mass through the fire of the cataclysmic war. The older people were more conservative and less adaptable in these countries. The result has been a more bitter clash between the old and the young than in the victorious countries of Europe. As a reaction the youth movement in Asia has been more undisciplined and less practical than in the West.

In the vanquished countries the reaction was entirely different. There the policy and conduct of the old had failed and led to disaster. The weakening hold of the old weakened further and suddenly the people in charge of affairs disappeared from the scene as a result of the revolution that followed the war, leaving control in the hands of new men—no doubt, old in age, but not those old people who had wielded power before the catastrophe of the war. These old men of the new régime did not have any prestige nor could they claim the experience and wisdom of the former leaders in affairs of the State. In all these countries—in Russia, Germany, Italy, Turkey—the controlling power very soon passed into the hands of the young or to organisations which, even when controlled by older men, consisted mainly of the young and which worked with the help and the outlook of the young or which successfully undertook to carry out the regimentation of the youth of the country.

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It should be noted that quiet times always favour the rule of the old as stirring changes give opportunities to the young. In quiet times the customs and conventions appear to have succeeded and everyone seems to grow into them and into the life prescribed by them. In times of quick changes or disastrous events the old tradition is discarded and the old rules are discredited. The old, being accustomed to be guided by the system into which they have grown, find it difficult to adjust, whereas the young, being children of that very time, can more easily enter into the spirit of the changes and being more supple by nature, can adapt themselves more easily to the changing environment. Where, as in most of the vanquished countries, organised violence has been used to secure political power, the young have more completely succeeded than in places in which violence could not be used or in which, as in the victorious countries, the old and the young coalesced by both approaching each other and thus bridging the gap between the two contending parties.

This conflict between the old and the young is accentuated or modified by several features in the social life of the community. If the religious feeling is strong, that is, if formal religion has a strong hold upon the people, this works for stability of the existing system and therefore is an aid

to the retention of power by the old. Thus the uprooting of the existing religious order is always the aim of the leaders of revolutionary youth movement. That is why religion was abolished in Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey and this explains the constant trouble that the Nazis and the Fascists have with the established religion of their country. Similarly, in the field of economic activity, growth of capital, which comes slowly and therefore after a certain age, has helped to keep the power in the hands of the older people by making the young economically insecure. Although not the sole reason yet this is one of the reasons why socialistic and communistic ideas are more widely spread among the young than among the old. A corollary to this growth of capital is the law according to which a man can bequeath his property to anybody he likes. This also is an instrument which keeps the young dependent upon the old, expecting to inherit. The young among the propertied classes in Bengal are more under the economic control of the father under the Dayabhaga system of law than such young men in some other parts of India where the Mitakshara system gives them immediate rights in the ancestral property. Improved system of education—whether general or vocational—works in favour of the young by developing their minds better and more quickly or by training

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them for a profession, in either case making them more self-reliant and independent. In most of the liberal professions a man reaches his peak long after his youth has departed. In a country, as Bengal, where the clever among the people mostly aspire for such professions, the best among the young do not form part of the movement which moulds the destiny of their compeers. On the other hand, every facility which helps the old to remain physically active and mentally alert will also help them to remain in power by combining the easy assimilation of necessary changes in their methods of adaptation with the experience and wisdom derived from their long association with the problems of life. From this point of view a really effective system of adult education helps the old to keep abreast of things and therefore to retain control of the public affairs of the country. Real democracy, which exists or existed in much fewer places than we imagine, tends to lean more on the young than on the old. This is so only as contrasted with the old type of monarchical system. The average age of the rulers under a monarchy is higher than that under a democracy but the latter, in its turn, is substantially higher than that under a popular dictator as in Russia, Germany, or Italy.

Another conflict that we find almost as widespread as the age conflict is that between the

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two sexes. Unlike other social conflicts the sex conflict has nowhere divided man and woman into opposite camps. The participants on each side have been from both the sexes. Thus we find many men as upholders of the rights of women and many women as upholders of the rights of men. Like the age conflict in normal times the sex conflict also can never be very bitter nor violent because of the cross-mingling of members of the family. As members of the same family men and women belong to the same unit and are held together by too great ties of love and affection to be breakers of each other's heads. The sex conflict is also like the age conflict in another respect. The inter-sex relations in a stable society without much changes and therefore without much challenge to tradition and conventions get adjusted to a particular type of culture. Individual behaviour, through upbringing from childhood, is fitted into the type of culture. When social changes take place this complacent situation is shattered. The most important change in recent years has been the decay in religious sentiments, religion everywhere having been the most potent influence in holding down women in the family circle. Almost all religious dogmas relegated to woman a social position distinctly inferior to that of man. With the loss, in recent years, of faith in religious dogmas man's conviction

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in woman's inferiority has been shaken to its foundation and woman's conviction in her rights independent of and even antagonistic to those of man has been brought to the fore. Again the principle of old-type authority, based upon and derived from the ancient patriarchal authority, was by its nature authoritarian, even dictatorial. It was also unreasoning in the sense that it was not based upon, and it was influenced only within narrow limits by, the independent judgment of the head of the family. It was mainly inspired by custom and convention which had some sort of religious sanction behind them. With the weakening of the religious sentiments and with the relaxing of the patriarchal authority the position of woman is being reviewed even by man from a new angle of vision. The same is also true of the older man's attitude towards the younger men. The old stricter type of joint family offered few rights to the men of the family, however old in age they might be, so long as the head of the family was alive and ruling. The control of the head was equally authoritarian over men and women of the family. Therefore, this relaxation of authority has not released women only but men as well. Also the spread of education and culture has helped to remove the moral support of all restrictions by showing their artificial nature. That is why not only some—

not all—women but also many men are vigorous supporters of the independent rights of women. Such consciousness among women is fostered more in a society in which women are well educated. In Bengal, particularly at Calcutta, parents—at least a large number of them—have started giving their daughters almost as good education as their sons. This is the reason why we find such ideas of women's rights more prevalent here than in many other parts of India.

There are, however, several factors which work against complete equality in the status of men and women. The first is the result of biological differences between the two sexes. As the bearer of the children of the race woman is handicapped in the race, for she is tied down during the period to a mode of life which must keep her away from any other work of an active nature. Even normally she is not capable of doing sustained physical work which requires strength. Athletic contests always emphasise the physical superiority of men over women. Also the world even now needs a lot of exploring and pioneering work which requires a kind of wild life for which women are constitutionally unfit. The second cause of women's continued inferiority is economic. In spite of education and technical training women have not yet caught up with men in the economic race. In the West they have, in large numbers,

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entered the liberal professions and to a smaller extent, in the services. Even there women's numbers in the technical professions have not been very encouraging. In India women's economic independence, even in the liberal professions, has been insignificant. So long as social stability continues there is no reason why women should not be economically independent in large numbers. But in the past women have suffered most during periods of social stability which is often accompanied with social stagnation. Probably their rights will be better recognised and their economic career more assured during the next period of social stability during which ideas about their rights and privileges are widely adopted. But if, as in the past, recognition of their rights and privileges depends upon a period of social instability, the nature and extent of such instability may fundamentally affect their position. In every country social instability, beyond a certain point, takes a violent form, and in all such periods of violent changes the physically strong man dominates because he is more useful in that era than woman. In Germany and Italy the woman's position is much worse to-day than what it was early in the present century. It is necessary to realise that this has been due more to the exigencies of the social situation than to any cut and dried theory about woman's position on the part of the Nazis or the

Fascists. It should also be noted that in the West woman's economic position in the family has considerably deteriorated. Owing to various developments the economic work of woman at home has become almost insignificant and man is no longer as dependent upon her as he used to be before. For the present, therefore, woman has not found her place in the economic life outside the home and her economic position at home has been undermined. Even in our country this is largely true in many homes of educated women. Further, so long as war remains as a major weapon of settling international disputes, physical strength and endurance will assign to man a higher position in social life and exalt him in the eyes of both men and women. This is so not merely during the actual period of war but also in times of peace. Peace, it appears, has come to man only as an interlude between wars. Therefore, preparation and training for war continue in times of peace and naturally emphasise the importance of the physically stronger sex.

Another obstacle in the way of a rational position of women in the social life of mankind is the strong sentiments which have enveloped man's ideas about the proper relation of the sexes. Except probably in rural parts of Russia and among some savage tribes the relation between the sexes has always been looked upon through

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a haze of artificial, unnatural, and conventional ideas on the part of both the sexes. Taking, as an illustration, the case of women in western Europe, in which their position is very much better than in our country and in which, owing to the scientific methods of study, the ideas have crystallised better than anywhere else in the world, we find that the relation of the sexes is still saturated with the two currents of thought which dominated human ideas in the past. One is based upon religious prejudices and the other upon the romantic. The religious idea condemns woman to an inferior position because she is supposed to be unclean, a tempter, and a base instrument of the devil. This idea, in a modified form, persists up to modern times. She has been looked upon with sin and horror. The romantic idea has come down from the medieval days of chivalry and is equally artificial and false although it may flatter the other sex. This surrounds woman with an unreal atmosphere of mystery and idealism and helps her to be, in social life, kept, so to say, in glass cases away from the dust and bustle of everyday life. This is the false situation of woman, which Ibsen tried to shatter in his famous play, *Doll's House*. But the problem cannot so easily be solved by dancing away nor by running away from home without proper arrangement for an economic career.

It is obvious that neither the religious idea of sin and horror nor the romantic idea of mystery and exaltation fit in with the realities of life in which man and woman are expected to go about in their own native hue untrammelled by imaginary degradation or elevation on the part of woman. Only when all such ideas have completely disappeared—and they are as yet far from disappearing even in western Europe—can man and woman look at each other in their true perspective and, therefore, develop social connections, in their mutual relations, which will be frank and objective in their main outlook. Woman rightly resents the religious idea of sin and horror. But she must not expect the romantic idea of mystery and exaltation when she comes down to the market place in competition with man. In other words, this competition between the sexes must be genuine, and woman must be prepared to fight and ask for no quarter beyond what the ordinary law and rules of conduct prescribe in the case of competition among men themselves. This mentality is now almost absent among women and is far from well established among men. In the West the real struggle will begin when women invade in large numbers the domain of men in the skilled trades and professions of the country. No false idea of chivalry can persist in the face of competition which will displace individuals in

the pursuit of their career for earning bread. In Bengal, in spite of many changes during the last two decades, the conflict between the sexes has only interested the dilettanti. Partly also it has allied itself with the age conflict. Thus the young among both men and women have been more interested in the sex conflict and the great movement for female education is supposed to have enlisted the support or at least the acquiescence of the educated among the older people. But the conflict as such does not exist nor its implications at all understood. As a conflict the only successful solution of the sex conflict is to secure full and complete economic independence of women—younger women if, as it is in most places, the conflict is allied to the age conflict. This will be possible when, on terms of equality, women are effective competitors of men in all spheres of life. In other words, women will be competitors of and will therefore displace in the professions men who may be their brothers, fathers, and other relatives in the joint family. The movement is nowhere near this stage in any part of the world.

The third conflict which has specially developed in the modern age is what may be called the race conflict. Throughout the ages this conflict has been brutal and devastating in its results. The reason is obvious. Man has always held

the stranger as his enemy. There are few ties of sentiment or self-interest with the stranger. This conflict has been further embittered by differences in physical traits, *e.g.* in features, skin colour, etc. Therefore, when man is in conflict with the stranger he is without pity or remorse. Of course, there is no inherent superiority or inferiority among the so-called races of the world. But the hostile feeling towards the strange man has always led the victor to claim superiority as a race. Such victory is nothing but the superior advantages which the victor has obtained either from the social circumstances of the victim or in the implements of warfare and organisation which he has happened to have for the moment. Anthropologists know that there is no inherent qualities in the races as such to make one superior or the other inferior. They also know that there is no pure race in the world now and that all are mixed up, although the degree of such mixture and the physical environment being different, there are differences in physical traits.

On final analysis the race conflict in modern times is really a clash of different cultures or one of economic interests. The race conflict between the Germans and the Poles was religious and political, that between the Germans and the Czechs was religious, political, and economic, and that between the Turks and the Armenians was



religious. The antagonisms between the Turks and the Arabs and that between the Turks and the Egyptians were mainly due to divergent standards and ways of living in spite of a common religion; that between the Hindus and the Moslems in India religious and political in spite, as in Bengal, of the same original stock. The exclusion of the Asiatics from America and of the Indians from Africa is due predominantly to economic causes because of the fear of the dominant race of being swamped by the labour of the immigrants who can afford to offer their services at a lower rate of wages owing to their lower standard of living. The supersession of industrial, plantation, and many other kinds of labour in Bengal by men from outside has not yet developed into a racial conflict, although many elements of such conflict are already discernible. In the case of the white races this conflict has taken an ominous aspect inasmuch as the rate of their increase in number is very much lower than that of the other races who attempt to encroach upon the white man's territory, which is vaster than what they have been able profitably to exploit and which the other races require for their development. This creates the danger of the white races being overwhelmed by mere increase in numbers on the part of the other races. This race conflict unconsciously vitiates



the minds of even scientific people bent on objective study of facts. For example, in defence of the American policy of excluding the Asiatics, which is based upon unadulterated race feeling in its political and economic aspects, an eminent sociologist says as below :

The restriction of immigration by a nation with a controlled fertility, fearful of being swamped by the overflow from congested blindly-multiplying peoples, will seem an insult when the excluded are of a different race. Under dread of population pressure many nations will eventually adopt policies which ignorance or malice will charge to sheer race antipathy—and which will be resented as such.

The successful operation of democracy requires that a people be fairly like-minded, able to think, feel, and act together. Exclusion of immigrants of an altogether different hue and culture may be motivated by a people's reluctance to become a hodge-podge of diverse colors, tongues, and faiths, with the most discordant moral and economic standards ; yet the policy will be interpreted as a gesture of racial arrogance.

Apart from religion which has its obvious share in race conflict the two other main causes

of the conflict are political and economic. The economic causes have operated with the extra-territorial or imperial capitalistic system of Europe " Big " money needed investment abroad and the exploitation of the untapped or under-tapped resources of the backward races tempted the capitalistic owners to force their capital and organisation upon the backward races of the world. This has happened all over Africa and in many parts of Asia. In America and Australia the problem was solved by the practical extermination of the original inhabitants. In Africa Belgian Congo saw horrors and brutality unprecedented in the history of man because of the cruel and deliberate nature of the policy systematically adopted by the Belgian king who refused to treat his African territory as part of his kingdom but used it as his private property. In other parts of the world the original inhabitants have been practically enslaved in many places and have nowhere received their due share of the wealth produced, nor received proper consideration for their general welfare. As an inevitable result racial consciousness has grown everywhere and has embittered mutual relations among the races which have come in contact with each other. Another economic cause which has unwittingly increased racial conflict is the modern methods of quick and easy means of communication. In

the old days movement was slow and an adventure. Thus one race could not fully dominate another nor the numbers of the former in the latter's country could be very many. A few traders or travellers or missionaries could move to the other race and, by virtue of their small numbers, had to be considerate in their relations with the other races. But with modern means of communication—also the destructive weapons in their hands—a much larger number, in their search for wealth, travel wider distances and, because of their economic and military strength, treat the other race in a manner which cannot but leave bitterness and hostility towards them.

The political causes are also in operation in the conflict of races. Before there was any popular government in the modern sense the government of a country was, however inadequately, a sort of arbiter between its own nationals and members of other races with whom the former came in conflict. With popular government political power has passed in the hands of the common people. Thus the members of the dominant race, being in control of political power, are supported in their predatory conduct towards the other race which has no voice in the government which controls both the races. This can be seen in the anti-Indian laws of South Africa, Kenya, Australia, and Canada. A variant of such policy

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but derived from it is the oppression of the minority by the majority who hold power in the system of popular government. Thus we find the oppression of the Germans and the Magyars by the Czechs, of the Austrians by the Italians, of the Finns by the Russians, and probably of the Indians in Burma and Ceylon. Again, the inevitable spread of Western civilisation among the so-called inferior races by their contact with people of the West make the former desire to govern themselves without the help of the latter. This also leads to race conflict for it is unlikely that the dominant race will consent to part with real power. Further, the spirit of nationalism, intensively cultivated in recent years, develops an amount of political intolerance which is hardly consistent with the basic principle of popular government. But it has grown all over the world both among the dominant races and among those who are under their heels. This also adds to the bitterness of race conflict which we find in the world to-day.

In modern times there has arisen another kind of conflict in which there is a clash of interests between those who live in urban areas and those who live in rural areas. This is an essentially modern problem in many of its aspects since it could not exist in the present form in older days when towns were fewer in number and the urban

population at a more fluid stage. The town always attracts the rich, the young, the adventurous, the luxurious, the leisured, and the cultured class. In rural areas the most important occupation is agriculture and next come cottage or home industries. Both these occupations generate an individualistic and separatist mentality, probably also one of fatalism and stolidity. Work does not bring people together nor success bring too vast differences in the ways of living. There is little difference in the intellectual outlook among the different grades of rural people. Custom and religious beliefs are well established and are rarely disturbed. In the physical sphere muscular strength is prized more than dexterity or subtlety. To be weak is really miserable. The townsfolk are considered to be physically degenerate, intellectually subtle and therefore dangerous, and morally parasitic. There is also a clash of economic interests. The agriculturist values the product of lands while the town values large-scale industries. The townsman is the middleman and the cultivator looks upon him as an interloper hostile to himself because of the former's share of profit in handling his products. The rural people usually produce more than they consume and are delighted with higher prices, that is, cheap money. The town-dweller is an earner of money profits and spends much more

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than the rural people. He wants cheaper goods, that is, dear money.

In the conflict the town is always stronger and gets its point of view well recognised. It is better organised, more articulate, controls or wields more influence with government, is more brainy and in better touch with the outside world, and arrogates to itself the right to be the sole repository of the culture and prosperity of the country as a whole. The rural people can rarely make themselves effectively heard, are dispersed and therefore disorganised, have rarely a determining voice in settling the price of their products which are probably sold in advance to the town dealer or in settling the price of the goods which they buy for their own use. Their schools are on the model of those in the towns and do not breed in the pupils any love for rural life or its occupations. This is naturally disliked by the rural people. In Bengal the town-country conflict can be seen in the contest between the growers of jute and its manufacturers over the question of price fixation, although this contest has not as yet grown to any serious proportions mainly owing to the ignorance of the rural people. The real conflict has gone on for some years in Russia where the country is also being organised on the same scale as the towns. But so far the town, that is, organisation of industrial labour, has

held the ground against the country, that is, organisation of agricultural worker.

Another kind of conflict which is found in human societies is the conflict between the followers of different religions or different sects within the same religion. Religious persecution has various motives behind it. Many fanatical men with little brain and less love for their fellow-men sincerely believe that the religion which they profess is the only true religion, that their god will be pleased if this religion is also followed by others, that he will be angry if that is not so, and that if this religion is forced upon others, it will be good for their soul. Thus these people invoke the pleasure of their god and the good of their fellow-men for the tyranny which they inflict upon others. There are again those who believe that suffering in this world will have its permanent reward in the next and thus prescribe suffering for themselves as also for others. If the latter are unwilling or truculent all the more reason for inflicting greater suffering on them for their own future good—here if possible, hereafter if necessary. Gibbon truly says of religious dogmas that they are all true to the devout, all false to the philosopher, and all useful to the statesman. Hence we find a large body of opinions which do not fanatically believe nor sadistically practise dogmatic religion but which none-the-less uphold

it and its practices because, according to them, this is essential for the stability of the social structure. It is in reference to this attitude towards religion that Marx calls religion the opiate for the masses and it is due to this reason that Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey have adopted the policy of systematic and deliberate undermining of the hold of religion on the popular mind. If social stability is a highly desirable objective such religion is necessary both for society and for the individual and was, as a purely pragmatic measure, advocated by the great philosopher, Immanuel Kant. But since his days social reformers allege that they have discovered other slogans which work as effectively as religion, especially among the young. For example, the reverence of the Nazi youths for the State and the Fuehrer is considered to be not much less in intensity than the older men's reverence for the Church.

Religious strife has been the curse of human society since the time when formal religion developed into an organised system. In Europe this can be seen in the persecution of the early Christians by Rome and their retaliation centuries afterwards against the pagans ; in the persecution by the Roman Church culminating in the attempt at the suppression of all independent thinking on the part not only of theologians or religious

preachers but also of scientific thinkers like Galileo ; in the working of the Spanish Inquisition ; in the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries ; in the persecution of the Huguenots in France, of the Catholics in the Netherlands, and of both the Catholics and the Nonconformists in England. In several cases the religious strife got mixed up with the race conflict with bizarre effect. Thus the Tsarist persecution of the eastern Poles for converting them into the Orthodox Church as a means towards Russianising them and the German persecution of the Western Poles for converting them into the Lutheran Church as a means towards Germanising them only confirmed the Poles as zealous Catholics. The same policy by Austria confirmed Bohemian Protestantism and the political—in a sense racial—persecution by Britain intensified Catholicism in Eire. In spite of the great tolerance of thinking and preaching in the U. S. A. there are even to-day several places there in which the Darwinian theory of evolution, because of its incompatibility with the orthodox Christian fable regarding the original creation of the species, is not permitted to be taught in the schools although the theory is now fully proved as scientific truth.

In western Asia, which has been the birthplace and cradle of several important religions of the

world, religious strife has been quite bitter. Among Europeans the strife between the Jews and the Christians has lasted for centuries and, after a brief period of respite during the spread of liberal culture and tolerance in the nineteenth century, appears to have burst out in its original fury, becoming more cruel and savage owing to the modern methods of organised activity and to the modern means of communication. The strife between the Christians and the Moslems culminated in the Crusades which lasted for centuries and which abated in their fury only with the decay of religious zeal on the part of the Christians and with their own internecine quarrels in Europe. The old strife between the Jews and the Moslems was assuaged for a time by the dispersion of the former from their original home and threatens to revive by the attempted juxtaposition in Palestine of the followers of the two religions. It should be noted, however, that the modern religious strife here is also complicated by the racial and economic conflicts, as can be seen from the fact that the Christian Arabs, whose number is very large in Palestine, are all with the Moslem Arabs in the new conflict between the Arabs and the Jews. Within the Moslems themselves there is the old strife between the Sunnis and the Shias, which has persisted up to modern times both in India and in the Middle East. The Moslem

opposition to the political power of Ibn Saud, Abdul Aziz, whose State is a pure theocracy, is due mainly to the Puritan support of the king from the Wahabis of Ikhwan and was organised by Hussein and supported by his sons, Feisal of Iraq and Abdullah of Transjordan. Iran refused to support this opposition to the Arab king partly because it is a Shia country and partly on political grounds ; Egypt refused to join on purely political grounds and Turkey because it had already left the safe anchor of religion for completely secularising the State. Within the Moslem religion there has been another sectarian strife due to the rise of the Ahmadiyahs. At one time this threatened the unity of Afghanistan but the sect migrated to northern India and has found a safe haven.

In India religious strife has been in existence from time immemorial. The Aryan religion displaced that of the original Dravidians and was in its turn superseded by Buddhism. Buddhism had internecine quarrels between the Hinayana and Mahayana sects. There is traditional evidence of strife between the worshippers of Shiva and those of Vishnu. Within Shaivism there have been several sects incompatible with one another, some of them, *e.g.*, the Tantric system, surviving competition by isolating themselves behind secret and mystic ritualism. In more

recent years there has been strife between the Hindus and the Moslems, the latest phases of which show that the religious conflict has merged itself into a political and, in Bengal, into an economic conflict. Also there are signs of sectarian conflict within the fold of Hinduism, especially between some of the higher castes and the so-called lower castes. For half a century there was in Bengal an internecine strife between the orthodox Hindus and the Brahmos, the acerbity of which has completely disappeared owing to the widespread liquidation of orthodoxy by the Hindus adopting the social reforms advocated by the Brahmos. This incidentally shows the method by which Hinduism in the past absorbed every religion, except Islam, that came to, flourished, and made its permanent home in India.

There is another conflict which should be mentioned because at one time it was severe in some parts of the world and more because in the modern world, in a more systematic form, it threatens to reappear on a wider scale than it ever was in the past. This is the conflict between those who are learned and those who are not. Wherever the autocratic form of government has developed in modern times this conflict has been seen in the suppression of inconvenient or uncontrollable opinions of the learned by the ignorant

but powerful men at the helm of government. This has been particularly the case in Russia, Germany, and Italy where the intellectuals have either been altogether eliminated or completely enslaved. In these countries a policy or a plan of action is first formulated as a means to the political or economic end already adopted and intellectuals are expected to study facts and fit or twist them in order to support that particular policy or plan of action. Those who do not do so or are unable or unwilling to do so are ruthlessly eliminated. This has happened in the study of all subjects even including physical sciences but has been more specially so in the study of the social sciences. Thus sociology has been distorted to support a particular race theory. At one time there was supposed to exist German physics and biology as distinct from the general sciences of physics and biology. History has been re-written in order deliberately to wipe out facts supposed to be favourable to the extirpated bourgeoisie in Russia and to exalt the classes and institutions which have come into power. In the study of social sciences the general laws and trends in evolution are more or less of universal application subject of course to distinct regional influences. This is natural because man in the depth of his nature has the same urges all the world over. But the intense nationalism and anti-cosmopolitanism

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of the dominant group does not tolerate the idea that the foundational urges and sociological tendencies of one's country are the same as elsewhere. Artificial efforts are made to bring out and emphasise stray and unessential tendencies, the study of which is elevated to independent subjects and often called science. Regimentation of youthful minds is undertaken in order to attain to a uniformity of ideas most of which are inaccurate and, in any case, none of which are studied with the object of liberating the human mind or even of acquainting it with the modern methods of scientific study.

From what we have said so far it should not be too hastily assumed that the conflict between the learned and the ignorant is absent in democratic countries. It was in Athens that Socrates was condemned to death. Some years ago when there was great anti-British feeling in the U. S. A. some politicians raised an election slogan pledging to "kick King George out of the schools of Chicago." In elections it has happened many times that the learned men were maligned by popular demagogues who, in the long run, won in the elections and sometimes even gagged their opponents. Democracy is a good thing, certainly it is better than most other forms of government devised by man. But it is assumed in too facile a manner that the opinion of the

majority is always correct. In all times of stress democracy has failed to give effect to its main principle of freedom of opinion and its expression. For example, in India not only have historical facts been distorted as in some U. S. A. elections but text-books in history have been re-written without much respect for historical facts. Teachers, who are expected to keep up a modicum of learning, have been derided in many countries and in India their position has been so undermined that they have little influence left with the masses of the people. In one Province in India they were compelled by the dominant party in political power to work as its canvassers and agents in party work. The independence of scholars to say what they think does not at all exist in many countries with the so-called democratic form of government. This has often happened because of the intolerant attitude of the very party which claims to represent democracy and advocates the adoption of the democratic principle for the country in a greater measure. It is correct to say that with the growth of democratic ideas and partial popular government in India the learned in the country have found it more and more difficult to secure or keep for themselves the facilities which are necessary to carry on their work and which, in a vastly ampler measure, have been secured for them in many

other countries of the world. The situation in India is much worse than that in the U. S. A. where an eminent historian describes the situation as below :

We have reached a point in American life where the maintenance of educational liberty can no longer be taken for granted. All over the country, schools are attacked by highly organised and well-financed minorities that seek to browbeat legislatures, the Congress of the United States, schoolboards and teachers. The precious values of liberty and scientific inquiry are threatened with extinction, and with them the principles upon which democratic government rests.

In the course of human history many institutions grow which reflect the social adjustment of a particular epoch. The needs of society in that epoch may be said to have crystallised in the current social institutions. When however we talk of society as a whole or its needs or its adjustment at a particular period we appear to mean as if the whole society including all its members found satisfaction in the dominant institutions of the epoch. This is far from true. Such a conclusion assumes that there is complete harmony within the society and that there is no

conflict of classes within the society so far as those institutions are concerned. But such conflicts always exist among the different classes within the same society and among different sections within the same class. Such classes or groups within a class may be more or less fluid permitting the passage of individuals from one class to another or from one group to another. Or, they may be so stereotyped and exclusive that it is almost impossible for an individual to move from one below to another above it. We should consider both these types of classes in their conflict within a society.

Conflicts of classes not altogether stereotyped may also take such serious turn as to cause great commotion within a country. One such type is the conflict between the clergy and the general body of the people. This usually happens in a country in which the clergy are rich and ignorant and use their resources to retain their powers over the people by means which are harmful to general progress. In the more distant past this has happened in many countries. The whole Protestant movement in Europe may be said to be a conflict of this kind. In the present century this has come about in many countries, especially after the last European war. As a result the clergy have been extirpated in Russia. In Turkey, Iran, and Egypt their power and influence have

been considerably reduced. In Saudi Arabia the conflict has gone on for some years now. In Germany and Italy the clergy have been reduced to great straits although their influence is still great. In Spain during the last civil war the clergy took at least as prominent a part in the struggle as the other classes and had the satisfaction of seeing their side victorious. In India the conflict started among the Sikhs some years ago and there are signs to show that such conflict is brewing within each of the Hindu and Moslem communities.

Another form which class conflict may take is that between the military and the civil population. A conflict like this started in Turkey soon after the last war but it was prudently given a new turn by the reforming zeal of Kemal Ataturk. Among first class Powers Japan is now the only country in which the military class has successfully seized political power although its success is not as complete as many such bid for power in medieval Europe. In Germany this struggle started soon after Hitler came into power and he had to conciliate the military class by liquidating some of his own followers; after that this conflict appears to have abated in its external manifestation. In several South American States military power seems to be the dominant factor in all political and some economic problems.



At some stage of social development there arises a conflict between the active and leisured classes. Till the beginning of the French Revolution political power was monopolised by the landed aristocracy, including all higher appointments in the army which were open to its younger members only. This system persisted in Russia up to the present century. In a less acute form it existed in most of the European countries up to the middle of the last century. Industrial development created a class of people who were equally rich with the landed aristocracy and if anything, more clever and energetic. Wherever the control of the latter was complete there was a revolution. In other places the adjustment was easier and consisted of the admittance of others to positions of power and influence and of the scions of the aristocracy training themselves for competition with their rivals.

The conflict between the landlord and the tenant and that between the capitalist and the labourer is to be found in the modern history of every country but is more relevant for purposes of our study under economic conflicts.

Again there are social institutions which clearly show the complete victory of one class over another in the class conflict which must have taken place in a previous epoch. In such cases the institutions are so stereotyped and exclusive in their nature

that it is almost impossible for the individual to move out of the groove into which he has been born. In such cases social conditions become similar to the ancient Roman society as described below by an eminent historian :

Society had been elaborately and deliberately stereotyped. As a rule, whatever a man's energy or ambition, he was doomed to work out his life on the precise lines which his ancestors had followed. All ideas of improvement were nipped in the bud, blasted by the stifling atmosphere of a despotism which, with whatever good intentions, received no guidance or inspiration from the thoughts or needs of the masses, and spent all its strength in maintaining unchanged the lines of an ancient system, instead of finding openings for fresh development. The same immobility reigned in the education of the privileged class. They felt no material need to stimulate invention and practical energy, and their academic training only deepened and intensified the deadening conservatism of unassailable wealth and rank.

Illustrations of such rigid social life can be seen in the history of almost every country—in the old pre-Revolutionary France, in Japan up to



the middle of the last century, and in India up to our own times.

If we investigate into the causes of such rigid social stratification we find that there is a variety of causes which ultimately lead to the establishment of such institutions. It should be noted that whatever the original cause the system becomes permanent and stereotyped in a society only when the continuity of the original rights and privileges is based upon the principle of heredity. Whatever the power and influence of an institution it can rarely be a spear-head of future conflict if its gates are open to all members of the community by virtue of special merit or achievement. It becomes a grievance sufficiently acute for class conflict and it becomes a stereotyped and exclusive institution only when the principle of heredity is introduced for admittance into it as its privileged members.

The original cause of such an institution may be different in different cases. At one stage in the development of almost every society the fighting capacity of a man was of utmost importance for the preservation and expansion of the community. In such cases an aristocracy of warriors as a profession was naturally created and this class was considered to be superior to all other classes. Martial tradition was maintained for a time in spite of the principle of heredity.

But heredity can never guarantee the continuance of martial, or in fact any, qualities. Therefore, after some time such a class became purely a burden to the society not being capable of performing its original function as efficiently as before. In India there was such an aristocracy among the Rajputs. In some cases an aristocracy is founded upon descent which is traced to gods or other god-descended families. This happens specially in societies in which there has been in the past clashes between different tribes and the victorious tribes are supposed to rule as the descendants of their gods. In Japan the royal house is so descended. In China up to 1912 it was the same. In India the Rajput kings claimed descent from the sun or the moon or mythological kings like Rama, all of whom had been deified. Such class distinctions are particularly absent in the social life of the U. S. A. mainly because of its historical background, the intermingling of all kinds of European peoples uprooted from their original homes and therefore their former traditions. There is no caste system but it is an ominous sign that many successful Americans love to trace their ancestry to distinguished ancient families of Europe or to the early settlers in America. There are more than twenty thousand members of such pedigrees in America divided among various so-called Orders of distinguished



lineage. The following are the more important among such "Orders" founded and made popular in recent years :

The Order of the Crown of America, which admits only those "descended lineally and legitimately from the royal houses of the Old World."

Baronial Order of Runemedede, composed almost entirely of bankers, business men, and manufacturers. There are two classes of "knighthood" : first, one made up of the 100 Founders of the Order and, second, one composed of the "lineal male descendants of one or more of the 25 barons who were selected to be sureties for the proper observance of the statutes contained in Magna Carta."

The Imperial Order of Yellow Rose admits only those of royal descent.

The Order of Colonial Lords of Manors in America is open only to descendants of one "who enjoyed feudal rights in any of the American Colonies prior to July 4, 1776."

The Scions of Colonial Cavaliers is composed of "Palatines" and "Landgraves," all descendants of British nobles who fought for Charles I against Cromwell.

Sometimes an aristocracy may start with the grant of lands by the monarch, which runs on the principle of heredity. Thus feudalism dominated European countries for several centuries. Even after the break-up of the political system based upon feudalism big landlords had political influence far beyond their numbers, competence, or even wealth. In Bengal the landed aristocracy had great power and influence up to the end of the nineteenth century. Its influence declined mainly because in almost all cases the principle of partition of estates was kept up in addition to that of heredity.

The basis of social stratification has been various. In earlier stages it used to be based mostly upon the fighting capacity of individuals. Again it may be the power and prestige wielded by virtue of one's holding a high position in government. This can be seen now in most of the countries in Asia, Africa, South America, and the countries of south-eastern Europe. Another basis is the clergy. Those who offer prayers and sacrifices for the laity are considered to be directly under the protection of the gods, and as mediators between god and the devotees their influence is naturally great with the masses. This has happened in all countries of the world. In India for centuries the priestly caste has held great power and has constituted itself as the guardian

of society in many other matters than merely religious ones. Manual work was left to the masses of the people and, in this way, came to be considered all over the world as a disgraceful occupation. Even to-day in the most advanced countries of the world a man considers himself to be in disgrace if he is compelled to do only manual work. The so-called dignity of labour does not yet exist and although manual work may be and is done by many higher classes as a hobby or an encouragement to such work by others, nobody want to do it as the main part of their earning a living.

In all societies in the past and the present times, especially in the present, an important basis of social distinction has been the possession of wealth and the influence which it gives to its owner. In many cases the bases of social position, *e.g.* fighting or government office, used to give social status mainly because they were also the most convenient or direct method of getting wealth. Even within the aristocracy of wealth a distinction is usually made between those who have acquired wealth and those who have inherited it. The principle of heredity is so ingrained in man as a result of his past history that he normally gives superior status to those who have inherited wealth over those who have acquired it. Possession of wealth

alone is not sufficient to give the social status and prestige of the aristocrat. There are certain recognised methods of displaying it which are intimately associated with the high-born. Thus living in a lavish style is supposed to be a test of such wealth in order to distinguish its owner from the plebeian who may have amassed a fortune by the baser method of work, industry, or commerce. A large number of retainers and attendants is another sign of aristocratic way of living. Even now there are parts of India, especially in Rajputana, where a man's social position is largely determined by the number of attendants that wait upon him and the members of his family, and a guest who waits upon himself, that is, does his own small things, is despised. Absurd ceremonialism may develop out of this kind of living. For example, in the West the aristocrat is supposed to live more cleanly than the vulgar folks. This formality in cleanliness and the principle of personal attendance have been pushed so far that when you arrive at an aristocrat's door you are met by a perfectly clean and perfectly groomed lacquey. But cleaner though he may be than you are he may, by virtue of his social inferiority, yet contaminate you and his master; so he carries your visiting card on a salver. Even this precaution is not final for the great aristocrat, and the lacquey must put

on white gloves to cover his hands. Another sign of aristocracy is not to do any kind of work which brings an income. The gentleman aristocrat may be busy in many ways, some of which may even be otherwise commendable, but he must not earn anything in the form of money income.

Exclusive hereditary classes tend to appear when the superior classes come to regard the inferior ones as of a lower species and when in course of time and by virtue of social demoralisation, the inferior classes also come to accept the situation as inevitable and therefore not abnormal. The differentiation becomes complete as a caste when the superior classes bar the avenues of approach to their fold on the part of all inferior classes. In the later Roman empire this happened for the *curial* who had few openings to rise to a higher level in social life. Gradually as the caste system hardens and crystallises it becomes a snobbish point of superiority for a higher caste to look down upon the inferior classes. This mentality pervades the whole system, a class lower down in the scale always looks down upon one further down in the scale. Thus it goes on for each caste—the Brahmans, the Kshatriyas, the Vaishyas, the Sudras, and the outcastes, and the innumerable other gradations in the caste system of India. Sometimes a distinct caste arises as a

protection against economic insecurity, the economically insecure attaching themselves as dependants upon the higher castes as happened in the feudal days in Europe. Sometimes again one class is dependent for its livelihood upon the higher classes and thus develops into an inferior class. The hierarchy is stabilised by State officials being recruited from the higher castes or the latter having special powers in the State.

Such a hereditary higher class, if not altogether brainless and foolish, naturally develops many qualities which help its members to keep up the distinction between themselves and the rest of the society. In course of time this may lead to a real difference in character. The members of the privileged aristocracy are proud, high-spirited, and liberal. Being in possession of wealth and power they are often independent, frank, good mannered, and dignified. On the other hand, the commoners have to work for their living but do so under the shadow of the disgrace which pervades all manual work. Either they emulate the aristocrats in good living in the vain hope to be their equals or they live frugally and are considered inferior for that very reason. The current law usually protects the aristocrats against the commoners; this makes the latter deceitful in their dealings with the aristocrats as also in their dealings among themselves. They lose all

initiative since it always rests with the aristocrats. They develop a complex of inferiority, which makes them unnatural in their behaviour, making them either subservient to the aristocrats or viciously aggressive. In this way permanent distinctions may arise in course of time and these are then advanced as proofs for justifying the separate existence of the hereditary classes.

POLITICAL CONFLICTS

So long we have been dealing with conflicts in society, which are mainly based upon social causes. Although such conflicts have, in many cases, a political or an economic background, yet their foundation is primarily social. We should now turn our attention to other conflicts to be found in a modern society, which are primarily based upon political causes. In ancient times there were several conflicts which could be assigned to political reasons. But here we shall confine ourselves only to modern times. Even so we shall be required to go back a couple of centuries in order to examine the political background of such conflicts. Looking back historically the first conflict may be said to have been in full swing in the eighteenth century between absolute monarchy and the popular checks to be imposed upon the

political powers of the monarch. The *ancien regime* in France was on the defensive, willing to make concessions and give some powers to the common people without loss of its prestige but did not know how effectively to do so. In Europe at the time two alternative methods of approach seem to have been in men's minds. In Britain it was advocated that the oligarchy which was in power should be liberalised and the economically or culturally advanced classes should be admitted to political power. On the continent of Europe pure despotism was the rule. Here the approach was to enlighten despotism by introducing the idea of social welfare into the objective of despotic government. Social speculation cropped up in abundance and destroyed the theoretical foundations on which despotism rested. Thus old monarchical ideas, based upon divine or semi-divine origin of the monarchy, were undermined and the foundation laid for the development of modern democratic ideas of governance. Two notable examples are the United States of America and France. The U. S. A. laid down a constitution—a republic and a democracy—which was unique for the time. It was the first republic on so large a scale and it gave specifically certain democratic rights to the commoner securing his liberty and giving him political power. This was also the first modern example of a written constitution



based upon a document which was permanent in character and which could be altered only by a specified process. This for the first time reconciled authority with liberty, the rights and powers of the component units of the State being provided for in a definite and unambiguous manner. It is only proper to note that the inspiration behind the new constitution was drawn mainly from Britain although the British constitution, taken as the model, was not what it actually was, but as it was interpreted by Montesquieu, Locke, and British constitutional lawyers. The American constitution has also given to the modern world a constitution based upon federalism. The Swiss constitution was too limited and the country too small to be a model for the larger countries.

France must also rank with the U. S. A. as a potent example to others not so much because of what it actually performed in the Revolution. Its achievement at the time was small, its constitutions visionary, and its immediate work transitory. But its political ideas were great and inspiring and have been the basis of all modern democracies. These ideas—euphemistically contained in the formula of liberty, equality, and fraternity—have fired the imagination of all political reformers since the time of the French Revolution. Also the military aggression of France for a quarter of a century roused the

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sentiment of nationalism in all parts of Europe and its political ideas were caught up by all disunited and subject peoples of the continent of Europe and, in course of time, travelled all over the world. This led to the national consolidation and independence of Germany and Italy and to national consciousness on the part of the Poles, the Czechs, the Magyars, the Greeks, the Slavs, and the Finns. Although we have been dealing with the conflict from the historical point of view it should be remembered that it exists even to-day in spite of the disappearance of monarchy from many countries of the world. The struggle between monarchy and popular government was going on up to 1914 in Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan, and Turkey and is still going on in Japan, Rumania, Bulgaria, Jugo-Slavia, Egypt, and Iran. Also the Buonapartists in France should be included among real monarchists.

The second conflict started in Britain early in the nineteenth century and spread over all Europe and beyond it. It led to the foundation of political and economic liberalism of the century. The conflict really started in the eighteenth century in the economic sphere when Adam Smith vigorously attacked the old system of Mercantilism as obsolete and unsuitable for modern government. Although it had some reforming effects even then

the real conflict must be said to have existed in the political sphere after the social philosophy of laissez-faire was fully established as a political doctrine. The sweeping reforms of Smithian policy were really adopted after the parliamentary reform in Britain as a result of the adoption of the political philosophy based upon laissez-faire. This principle was dominant in the political life of Britain, and then of Europe, between 1825 and 1870. It may also be called the period of Benthamite individualism. It was a great support to the system of political constitutionalism which steadily advanced in the nineteenth century in all countries of Europe—rapidly in some, in a less marked degree in others. But everywhere it was accepted by a very large body of people as the political goal to be attained. After the defeat of Germany, Austria and Turkey, and the collapse of Tsardom in Russia, this principle was adopted in all the countries of Europe, in some probably in a manner which did not exactly contribute to its stability in the political constitution. Without exception the British constitution was copied everywhere without realising even in Britain that another conflict had already started in order to supersede the principle of laissez-faire. However, the characteristic principles of the system still held ground, *viz.* nationalism and democracy. Each government should consist, as far as possible,

of a homogeneous people. In spite of the question of minorities, which gave great trouble and created great confusion, the succession States of Europe were more national and homogeneous than the older empires which they replaced. The principle of democracy was adopted on the exact pattern of Britain and has therefore been mostly unworkable because the British model works with customs, conventions, traditions, and understandings which are not in the written part of the constitution and which could not be transported abroad.

But from the middle of the nineteenth century the economic miseries following on the acceptance of the principle of laissez-faire were evident everywhere, especially in the industrially advanced countries of Europe. Britain saw them earlier because industrialisation came there earlier than elsewhere. Starting as a humanitarian movement the conflict soon developed into a political one demanding first the protection of the economically weak, next the permission on their part to combine in order to grow in economic strength, and finally the conferment of political power on them in order to secure an effective share in government. Simultaneously, among all classes of people, there was a growing feeling that leaving economic affairs to the individuals concerned was no solution of the economic problems of the country as a whole since economic life was becoming more

complex and economic welfare of the State more inter-dependent upon the warring units within the State. Thus started the conflict between laissez-faire and collectivism. The latter advocated the policy of greater control by the State for the general welfare of the whole society. Laissez-faire does not believe in the use of the coercive machinery of the State for any purpose except preservation of order within the country and resistance of aggression from outside. Collectivism wants to use this coercive machinery, which so far has been purely political, to serve the purpose of general economic welfare. This struggle has gone on for more than half a century although neither side can be said to be wholly defeated. But the new idea has made its way into the old political organisation. Thus we find that there has been a change in the ideas about the functions of government and that organs of the State have multiplied accordingly. The result is the modern State departments of agriculture, industries, labour, health, communications, etc. To this extent it appears that the principle of collectivism has been well established and accepted by all although it cannot as yet be said to have completely overwhelmed the political ideas based upon the principle of laissez-faire.

In the mean time another conflict has already started within collectivism itself. How far can

this political interference by the State in the economic affairs of society be carried with safety and efficiency? The cautious collectivist would not go very far. There may be a certain use of the protective tariff. There may be introduced factory legislation, social insurance, arbitration procedure, agricultural improvements; in some countries even State railways, posts, telegraphs, telephones, broadcasting. But in the main the individualistic basis of the economic structure has been left intact by the encroaching powers of the political machinery. But this does not satisfy the new wing of opinion. State-Socialism wants to go far beyond mere external control. It wants that the State should actually own all means of production so that all productive industries will belong to the State. State-Socialism does not advocate any special change in the constitution of the State. That will remain exclusively political as it is at the present time. But on this question there has arisen a further conflict within State-Socialism itself dividing it between what may be called constitutional State-Socialism and revolutionary State-Socialism. The former claims rightly that it has so far had really no opportunity of working its ideas into practice. Except railways, posts, telegraphs, etc., no country has yet had an opportunity of putting the ideas of State-Socialism into practice with the help of

the existing political machinery. It says that the existing constitutional State, that is, political democracy, can successfully use the coercive powers vested in the State for all economic purposes including economic measures to be adopted under the new system. On the other hand, revolutionary State-Socialism agrees that coercion is the basis of all social order and therefore of all economic measures by the State. But it insists that this coercive power should not remain, as now, in the political machinery but should vest in purely industrial organs to be specially set up for the purpose. That is, all coercive powers of the State should be transferred to bodies created specially on the basis of the economic lines of division in society. This system wants to abolish all political bodies. It argues that the economic side of human life is what is a matter of real public concern and economic welfare is the only important goal of political life. Therefore, political organisations, as they exist now, are superfluous, even mischievous when they divert public attention away from the main goal of human organisation. Also there is no means of reconciling the present constitutional system with separate organs of the State which must be devised and instituted in order to safeguard, promote, and co-ordinate the economic interests of the society as a whole.

With about the same objective two systems have come into existence under revolutionary State-Socialism, *viz.* Syndicalism and Communism. Both advocate coercive measures for economic development and both support coercive action in order to usher in the policy of economic direction on the part of the State by supplanting political institutions. Also both understand by economic interests of the society the economic interests only of industrial workers. In Russia the councils of workers started as purely economic bodies but completely overwhelmed and abolished all ordinary political organs of the State and secured to themselves the full powers of the State.

In spite of this conflict between the political and economic organs to secure the full powers of the State several attempts have been made to bring about a compromise between the two opposed ideas which have been current in modern times, especially after the last European war. We may usefully consider here three such attempts. Just before the last war Guild-Socialism had many supporters in Britain. It advocates a complete separation of the economic and other functions of the State. The existing constitutional machinery is to remain as it is but with its powers confined to all non-economic measures. Fresh and altogether separate State organs are to be instituted for all economic purposes. The organs

of economic government are of such primary importance that they cannot be subordinate to the ordinary political machinery but must be co-ordinate with it. In other words, there will be two independent parliaments, one guarding the political interests of society and the other its economic welfare. The questions of wages, prices, conditions of labour, co-ordination of economic measures, settlement of industrial disputes, etc., will be in the sole charge of the economic parliament and will be beyond the jurisdiction of the political parliament of the country.

Such a scheme is obviously open to grave objections. We may here note only two of them which go to the foundation of Guild-Socialism. The first is that it is impossible to divide human life into two such mutually exclusive groups of activities like the political and the economic. The one always affects the other. Political measures have their repercussions upon the economic life of the people and economic measures may foster or undermine the economic interests of political classes as such. The result of such an exclusive division will be either an almost continuous feud between the political and economic parliaments or a gap left between the two types of activities—a sort of no-man's land—in which neither parliament will exercise its jurisdiction. In either case it will be deleterious to the interests

of the country, especially in its rivalry with other countries. The second objection to such a complete division of powers and authority is constitutional and juristic. Can sovereignty be divided like this between two types of organs within the same State? Obviously sovereignty must be kept indivisible. In operation either the one or the other parliament will have the determining voice as ultimately political sovereignty has vested in the House of Commons in Britain. Therefore, it appears that there is an irreconcilable conflict between State-Socialism and Communism and that no compromise between them is possible. In such circumstances each school develops its own separate ideology and that is what has happened in the present case.

A few practical attempts have been made to introduce compromises in the written constitutions of some countries and these deserve our consideration. The countries are Eire, Germany under the Weimar constitution, and Italy. The first two are analogous while the case of Italy is different. The great weakness of political democracy lies in the constituencies which are the basis of the electoral system. The country is divided vertically into territorial units which have no features common to one another and which are devised purely for administrative convenience. The parliamentary representative elected from one



such constituency is supposed to represent all the people within it and to safeguard and promote all the interests of its inhabitants. Such a thing is impossible and absurd—impossible because one man cannot properly look after all the conflicting interests of all the members of the constituency—no human being can do so ; absurd because the elected representative, if he is of any worth, must be a member of some class and he is expected to represent, that is, protect and advance, the interests which are in conflict with those of the class to which he belongs. Economic interests, in fact most interests except those of purely local administration, divide the country horizontally. The labourer of one place has more similarity of interests with the labourer of another place than with those of the employers of his locality. The political, that is, territorial, division might be sufficient when the main question before government used to be the maintenance of order within a territorial unit or the contribution in men and money for the defence of the realm. But government is much more complex now and the measures discussed in any legislature of the world or the steps taken by any executive authority must, in the vast majority of cases, immediately affect the delicate balance of economic relations not of isolated units but of different economic units all over the country. Such interests, the discussion

on which and the action affecting which form the major part of the work of governance, go altogether unrepresented. Therefore, if one parliament is to be retained as at present the constituencies, which form the basis of the electoral system, should be based upon the functional or vocational rather than the territorial system. One homogeneous group of workers with common and allied interests should form part of the same constituency irrespective of the place of their residence which is only an accidental and unessential feature of their life. Thus labourers of a particular grade or lawyers or engineers or artisans throughout the country should form the same constituency to elect their representatives in the parliament. That is, a voter should be an elector not by virtue of his residence in a particular locality but by virtue of his or her being a member of a particular trade or profession.

The compromise which was adopted in Germany in the Weimar constitution and now in Eire is a mild one of having an advisory body elected on the basis of the voters' trades and professions. It does not in any way attempt to supersede the political parliament but leaves it as it is with its full powers intact but simultaneously aims to set up a second chamber on the new model. In Eire the plan has not yet gone beyond that of separate councils for different trades and

professions. Article 45 of the constitution of Eire says that the parliament may provide for the establishment of Functional or Vocational Councils representing branches of the social and economic life of the nation. A law establishing any such Council shall determine its powers, rights, and duties, and its relation to the government of the Irish Free State. In Germany the plan developed further and a parliament of industry was set up which functioned for more than a decade. Article 165 of the Weimar constitution stood as below :

For the protection of their social and economic interests, workers and salaried employees shall have legal representation in Workers' Councils for individual undertakings and in District Workers' Councils grouped according to economic districts and in a Workers' Council of the Reich.

The District Workers' Council and the Workers' Council of the Reich shall combine with representatives of the employers and other classes of the population concerned so as to form District Economic Councils and an Economic Council of the Reich, for the discharge of their joint economic functions and for co-coperation in the carrying-out of laws relating to socialisation. The District Economic Councils and the Economic

Council of the Reich shall be so constituted as to give representation thereon to all important vocational groups in proportion to their economic and social importance.

All Bills of fundamental importance dealing with matters of social and economic legislation shall, before being introduced, be submitted by the Government of the Reich to the Economic Council of the Reich for its opinion thereon. The Economic Council of the Reich shall have the right itself to propose such legislation. Should the Government of the Reich not agree with any such proposal, it must nevertheless introduce it in the Reichstag, accompanied by a statement of its own views thereon. The Economic Council of the Reich may arrange for one of its own members to advocate the proposal in the Reichstag.

Powers of control and administration in any matters falling within their province may be conferred upon Workers' Councils and Economic Councils.

The Constitution and functions of the Workers' and Economic Councils and their relations with other autonomous social organisations are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Reich.

Along with the old parliament this parliament has also been abolished now. The German scheme was called the parastatal system and was certainly growing in power and influence although it is doubtful whether it could ever become as powerful as the political parliament or supersede it in the long run. This division of powers between the two chambers was always a complex problem which roused lively discussions but led to no definite conclusion even among theorists.

In this connection it is worthy of note that full powers of the State, which had been seized in Russia in 1917 by the economic organs, *viz.*, the councils of workers and peasants, have been taken away from them and the country has theoretically returned to the system of current political system under the new constitution of 1936 although the system of economic councils has been retained as the basis of the new constitution as well. It is obvious, however, that little real power has been left with the councils or the parliament under the regime of dictatorship which functions in Russia.

The constitution of Italy promulgated in 1939 has made it a Corporative State. The practical result of the new parliament in Italy is of little value inasmuch as the old parliament on the territorial basis did not, and the new one on the functional or vocational basis does not, possess any sovereign power which rests elsewhere under

the regime of dictatorship. But the constitutional importance of the Italian scheme is very great because for the first time in the history of man such a constitution has been devised for any country. In Russia the councils of workers and peasants are economic bodies which had secured full political powers but they were and even now are more territorial than purely functional or vocational in their elective system. In Germany the parliament of industry was purely functional or vocational but it was only an advisory body to the Reichstag. In Italy both these fundamental principles have been combined and the Chamber of Fascios and Corporations—so far as the elected members, that is, the corporations, are concerned—is purely functional and vocational and it has superseded the old Chamber of Deputies. Its grave defect is that there is no democratic franchise in Italy as there was none for the old parliament. There is no doubt that under pressure of changing conditions of the world constitution-makers of other countries will have to draw, in future, upon the constructive features of the Italian constitution of 1939.

All the political conflicts which we have so far discussed have arisen out of ideas regarding constitution, which accept the coercive power of the State and want to place it in the hands of the rulers for specific purposes and therefore

suggest different composition of the supreme and sovereign body which is to wield that coercive power. There was one conflict which arose and died in the second half of the nineteenth century and took a different line. Anarchism refused to recognise the need for any coercive power in the State in any of its institutions and advocated that man in society should be simply left without a coercive State organisation. Although there have survived a few speculative anarchists the movement as such has disappeared from the field and therefore this political conflict does no longer exist.

Within the existing structure of political democracy there are two types of conflicts which must be mentioned here. These are sectional and party conflicts. The present system of political democracy works on two fundamental assumptions, one of which has in recent years shown signs of weakness. The first assumption is that all political bodies accept in a general way the principles and the institutions which have been set up under the constitution of the country and therefore agree to work the constitution in the right spirit so that the maximum benefit may be obtained from the institutions. If any minor changes are desired they are to be introduced only by means of constitutional agitation and by persuading the majority in the

parliament to accept those changes. In the countries in which political democracy exists, that is, in Britain, the U. S. A., Switzerland, and several Dominions of the British empire now and France, Sweden, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and Denmark up to early 1940, all political parties of any influence accept this fundamental position that the constitution is substantially well conceived and that alterations should be introduced or advocated only by what is called the constitutional method, that is, through the constitutional machinery provided for the purpose. The second assumption on which this constitutional or political democracy is supposed to be based is that the parliamentary scheme would be worked in practice in a system in which ordinarily two political parties—neither more nor less—would be contesting with each other for power. This is necessary in order to produce a definite policy underlying the political objective of each party when it comes to power. This has been more difficult to retain in recent years. In France this two-party system never developed and the consequence has been too frequent changes in the party alignments and therefore of government policy. This makes the working of political democracy weak and vacillating and has brought discredit on democracy itself as an ineffective instrument for purposes of government. In

Britain things are very much better. Even then there have been difficulties first by the rise of the Irish party which at one time could determine the balance in favour of either of the two major parties of the time, *viz.*, the conservative and liberal parties. Later on, the rise of the labour party took the same position in British politics as the old Irish party. The situation has gone back to the former two-party system after the debacle of the liberal party during the last war although since then the labour party has weakened so much that the conservative party alone has been left in power. This also is against the working principle of political democracy which always envisages a two-party system. It is only in the U. S. A. that the two-party system has been well maintained and the voters are mostly divided between the democratic and republican parties.

Between the parties there is a continuous and irreconcilable conflict which is expected to be permanent and which is supposed to keep both alert and efficient. This is true so far as deliberation and discussion leading to legislation is concerned. But in regard to executive work it appears to an outside observer that this is not the best way to carry through any work with the maximum efficiency. It is a good deal queer and strikes one like carrying a log of wood over a

hill by twelve men, seven of whom are pulling uphill and five pulling downhill, instead of all the twelve pulling in the same direction. Such a system is bound to detract from efficiency. But it has worked fairly well in political democracy although it breaks down at every period of crisis. Its success in normal times is due to the existence of the other principle according to which all parties accept constitutional democracy and never work against its fundamental assumption that the majority is to be converted to one's views only through the constitutional machinery provided for the purpose. As soon as dissatisfaction in the country grows beyond a certain limit the temptation on the part of the leaders of movements embodying such popular dissatisfaction is to attempt to secure political power by means other than those provided by the constitutional machinery. Thus the working of political democracy appears to be based upon a finely balanced mechanism—a two-party system, both parties always working through the constitution, all accepting the fundamental principles of the existing constitution. This can happen only when the political opinion of all shades is more or less uniform and the people a homogeneous one. If these conditions do not exist there will arise conflicts of parties and interests, the intensity of which may be so great as to induce them to



disregard the restraints imposed in the constitution upon their liberty of action. In such cases one or more groups may try to secure political power by violence or other extra-constitutional methods.

Again, modern democracy accepts nationalism as the fundamental basis of its operation. This is necessary in order to secure a homogeneity in culture and to a less extent, of political interests, without which the subtle balance of democracy will be upset. But this spirit of nationalism also generates a spirit of exclusiveness and creates a new conflict of nationalities. One nation is pitted against another and thus a conflict more intense and aggressive than any conflict within the homogeneous people is created, which has had devastating effects, for such nationalism makes nations selfish and inconsiderate about the economic and other interests of the rivals. The final method of composing or resolving such national conflicts is resort to war which is hardly a method of permanent value since the vanquished nation can never accept the issue of a war as a fair decision of the righteousness or otherwise of its case. Such conflicts among nations usually arise as a result of conflict of economic interests, which leads to political alliances among nations, thus dividing them into two opposite and antagonistic groups.

We now come to the last of the political conflicts, which has shown itself during the last two

decades. This conflict has been the result of the rise of popular dictatorship, which has been thrown up in several countries in the place of the old monarchy based upon a hereditary oligarchy, with, in several cases, a brief period of confused and inefficient democracy following on the overthrow of the monarchy. No doubt there have been transient but powerful causes favouring the rise of such dictatorship. These are mostly to be found in the political and economic circumstances arising out of the defeat in the last war or of failure to secure the anticipated benefits out of that war on the part of a few of the victorious countries. The vanquished countries are Germany and Turkey and in a sense, Russia, and the disappointed countries are Japan and Italy. But there are deeper causes which have more permanent effects in the determination of this conflict between democracy and dictatorship. It will be wrong and unscientific to assume that this conflict is a transitory feature in the political life of modern times and that it has not been the result of more deep-rooted causes than the apparent ones following on the last war.

As we have already seen the idea has gained ground everywhere that the old principle of *laissez-faire* is no longer suitable for modern life. Government interference in the economic and other departments of life has increased to such



an extent that old liberals like Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Gladstone, even Morley would be shocked out of their wits at what even the liberals advocate now as the legitimate part of government work. In other words, totalitarian control and direction of national life has come to exist, grudgingly in Britain in the form of concessions, noisily in the U. S. A. in the form of the New Deal, and completely in Russia, Germany, Italy, and Turkey under the guise of dictatorship. Modern life has become too complex, sections within the country have become much too conscious of their separate interests, and the balance of economic life has become much too delicate for the existing machinery of political democracy to handle the problems smoothly and yet adequately. The result is great dissatisfaction in every country with the rate of progress in government interference or with the manner in which the problems have been tackled. Also economic disasters come too quickly to be adjusted as quickly by the dilatory methods of political democracy, there being always a time lag between the two. Ventilation of grievances by free discussion and attempt at compromises, which are essential features of democracy, prevent it from taking quick decision and immediate action. Also the economic and other interests of nations, in spite of political isolation, are inter-connected with

one another owing to the immense progress in the means of communication. Again, political democracy is based upon an emphasis on individualism which cannot be too easily eliminated, as it is required to be, in taking action for the general good of the country. All action of the State for controlling and directing the economic life as a whole necessarily involves a degree of suppression of individual initiative which is traditionally distasteful to political democracy. Further, the spirit of nationalism which has grown into an aggressive instrument directed against other nations tends to work against the spirit of individual liberty which is specially fostered by political democracy. Thus the conflict between democracy and dictatorship is, in the final analysis, also a conflict of the totalitarian against the individualistic form of economic control, of aggressive nationalism in foreign policy against individual liberty within the country, of methods of parliamentary deliberation and discussion against rapid decision and efficient execution, of the growth of strong antagonisms at home against the old ways of a homogeneous people.

All these conflicts can be seen in almost every important country of the world to-day. In countries where the authoritarian form of government has been instituted the success has been

due to immediate causes which vary in different cases but the fundamental causes arise out of the conflicts which we have enumerated above. The immediate predisposing circumstances in each such country have been different. Thus in Russia the authoritarian government came because of the collapse of Tsardom and the vacillation of the Mensheviks ; in Germany because of the economic strangulation and military discipline ; in Turkey because of the mutilated State becoming national and because of Anglo-French jealousy ; in Italy because of the incompetence and vacillation of post-war ministries ; in Poland because of Russophobia and distrust in French power and influence ; in Spain because of foreign intervention in the name of the farcical system of non-intervention ; and in Hungary, Greece, Jugo-Slavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania because of the exigencies of the Balkan situation and the complete absence of any democratic tradition or predilection among their peoples. There are many other countries in which the conflict between democracy and authoritarianism is still going on and the result is yet uncertain although authoritarianism is gaining ground. In Japan the black dragon movement has gained considerable adherents from among all the higher classes of society including the officials of the State, especially the younger members of the army and the navy, which by the

way have constitutional machinery to create deadlocks in government. The constitution which is being adopted now is based upon the system of one political party in the country, thus liquidating all political opponents. In France the cross of fire had many supporters, especially since its formal dissolution a few years ago. In Belgium the Flemish party was frankly authoritarian in their demands for political reform. In Holland also there was a party modelled on and inspired by the Nazi system of Germany. The tendency of delegated legislation is towards the authoritarian form of carrying on governmental work and can be seen in countries where political democracy is firmly established. In Britain there have been many more orders-in-council since 1919 than probably during the whole century previous to that date. In France the legislature has, on many occasions, authorised the Minister to rule a particular department of the State by issuing decrees. In times of stress and crisis the federal government of the U. S. A. has always tried to assert its authority over the States. The last two decades have seen greater stress and more frequent crises in many social and economic matters. Probably that is the reason why the exercise of federal powers has been more evident in recent years. And in federal government the President's initiative has been more pronounced



than ever in the history of the U. S. A. This has occurred repeatedly—in the assumption of federal powers in the centrally controlled police—"G" men, originally meant for the enforcement of Prohibition—for suppressing violent crime, racketeering, and gangsterism; in attempting to meet the grave economic situation arising out of the depression of 1929-32 by introducing the New Deal, the National Industrial Recovery Act, social security legislation for unemployment and health insurance, unemployment benefit, and old age pensions; and in attempting to regulate agriculture on a nation-wide basis. We are not concerned here with the rightness or otherwise of these measures on their merits but with their constitutional significance. Most of these efforts were declared illegal by the Supreme Court on the ground that these problems belong to the jurisdiction of the States and not of the federal government or the President. The Supreme Court has also been attacked for this purpose and is being made amenable.

Thus we find authoritarian inroads into modern political democracy at three stages. In several States it is completely successful, *e.g.*, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey. In several others it is driving forward and is gaining ground, *e.g.*, Japan, France. In others again it has been accommodated within strict limits although these limits

themselves seem to have strained the constitutional machinery, *e.g.*, Britain, the U. S. A. It should also be noted that modern dictatorship, both in its origin and in its functioning, is different from the old monarchy. It is everywhere based upon popular support, the same that is the foundation of political democracy. This popular support may be the result of propaganda and regimentation but nonetheless there is immense popular support behind the dictatorship. There is little to distinguish between the methods of propaganda of the dictatorship and democracy except that the former is more complete and thorough.

ECONOMIC CONFLICTS

We now come to the last of the series of conflicts which we propose to discuss. These are economic conflicts. Some of these have already been considered under social and political conflicts according to their predominant social and political features. But a few others need separate consideration here. The first and probably the oldest of such conflicts which have persisted up to modern times is the conflict between the landlord and the peasant. We need not be detained here with the origin of landlordism, the causes of which are different in different countries and at different times in the same country. But the problem



arose in almost all countries. Different features of this conflict have been observed in its history but the one common feature which can be found in every case—during, it should be noted, the period of degeneration of the system of landlordism—is the attempt on the part of the landlord to keep the peasant in a state of subordination by making him economically weak or dependent on the landlord. In Britain, owing to historical causes, the system of *metayage* came into existence, which is an adjustment that took off the edge of peasant grievances although it has left him dependent upon the landlord for all major improvements. In the rest of the world there has been a grim struggle, for in many cases the peasant was really a serf or a hereditary bondsman tied to the land and its owner. In France the Revolution was acclaimed in the rural areas by the peasants and it led to the present system of peasant proprietors, in which the peasants are now the owners of the lands which they cultivate. The abolition of slavery in the U. S. A. broke up the big plantations and terminated all the evils of landlordism. Ireland was one of the worst countries in western Europe till the last quarter of the nineteenth century when the peasant ownership of land was introduced. The fellah is now the owner of his land in many parts of Egypt. The greatest change has been in Russia since 1918 when the

landlord's title to more than one lakh large estates was simply wiped off along with the heads of most of the owners. This was prudently accepted as a warning by the countries of eastern and south-eastern Europe, in most of which landlordism was abolished by the State in order to make the countries safe from Bolshevism by removing the major cause of rural discontent. The revolutions in Mexico have resulted in the complete disintegration of landlordism as of many other institutions. Thus we may say that in this conflict between the landlord and the peasant the former has gone down everywhere in Europe and North America. The system of landlordism now exists in South America, Africa, and Asia. In eastern India, especially in the areas in which the land revenue has been permanently settled, the conflict started nearly a century ago but made little headway till about two or three decades ago. The conflict has been mostly confined to struggles regarding rentals, length of lease, tenant's rights of property, inheritance and contract, ownership of tenant's improvements, prerogatives of landlords. In Bengal it has taken a more serious turn affecting the very existence of the system of landlordism and it appears to be doomed. The conflict is purely economic and a solution should be and can be found on economic lines. Unfortunately however, the Floud Commission looked into the

question mainly from the political and to some extent, the diplomatic point of view and forgot to give much time to study the economic aspects of the question.

The next economic conflict is that between what are called labour and capital. It should be more properly called a conflict between employers and wage-earners. It may be said to be the most acute and the most explosive of all economic conflicts of modern times. The conflict has been ushered in by three causes. The first two are the result of the industrial revolution which has created a body of landless labourers dependent entirely upon their wages earned in the industries. This body of workers have found themselves helpless and therefore unconscionably exploited by the employers. The second cause is the factory system which has brought together a large number of workers and has therefore helped towards a continuous exchange of ideas and thus towards combined effort to redress their grievances. The third cause is the spread of general education and infiltration of political and economic ideas about their rights and the methods of securing them. The Socialist manifesto of Marx and Engels issued in 1848 may be said to have formulated the plan of action of the workers as also inspired them since that date. It was a doctrine of extremism which succeeded

for a time in Russia but it has coloured the outlook of all workers in every country and has guided their action in many cases.

We are here concerned with the conflict itself and not with the arguments which have been advanced by the parties to the conflict. But one fact appears to be well established. That is that the Socialist criticism of the existing distribution of the factory income is largely correct although their proposals for a remedy appear to be too unpractical and violent. We may note here some tendencies in our own times which may be divided into those which help the workers and those which tell against them in this conflict. The wasteful and extravagant use of wealth by the rich has created a sentiment against them in spite of their magnificent display of the sense of social obligation by endowing large-scale charities for the humanitarian, scientific, æsthetic, and cultural advancement of the world. Also it is doubtful whether the charges for capital, organisation, and enterprise need be so high as they are in order to keep up the even flow of men for the supply of these essential agents of modern production. Must the price for that be as high as between 30 and 40 per cent. of the gross income of an industry? May there not be an iron law of profits as much as, it is said, there is an iron law of wages? Again, the present

system is frankly acquisitive and has led to wastage in production, restriction of output, buying up and suppression of patents which would have improved production but made the existing fixed plant obsolete, adulteration, fraud, over-capitalisation—especially after the last war,—and short-sighted squandering of natural resources that is definitely injurious to man's economic interests in the long run. Further, in former times the successful business man used to be always the man working for the business and however large his income, he was also working hard. Under the modern system of limited liability the shareholders do nothing like that and receive high dividends although the share of their risk in the business is definitely limited to the amount of their share capital. Moreover, there is a general feeling that this leisured class, with the help of their money thus earned and the influence acquired in consequence, hold a position in the social and political life of the country which is altogether disproportionate to their number or usefulness, thus practically circumscribing the scope of public life of the man who has to devote his time to earning a livelihood. Unfortunately also there are grounds to suspect that in the interest of this class of men there have been occasions when the cause of international peace, free speech, free press, academic



freedom, and impartial justice has been in jeopardy.

On the other hand, there can be found many factors which have worked against the wage-earners. The most important is the claim of the industrial workers to all political power to the exclusion of all other classes in society. The greatest weakness of Socialism is that it has failed to recognise intellectual workers also as part of those who, like manual workers, are dissatisfied with the existing system and who would like to join the manual workers in the conflict. Even among manual workers the well-organised industrial workers have claimed a monopoly of power against the peasants. In spite of the great peasant movements in Russia political power, so long as it was with the masses, was entirely in the hands of the councils of workers and not in those of the councils of peasants. Thus the industrial workers have isolated themselves by their extreme demand for a monopoly of political power in their hands. And they have already demonstrated how ruthlessly they can use this power to extirpate all other classes and to hold in subordination the great mass of peasants who outnumber them in such a large proportion. Also the claim for equality has been pushed too far in modern democracy. There is undoubtedly a difference in the natural abilities of men, which

refuse to be levelled down by a system of common education and by a common environment. In exercising a vote, which requires intelligence and judgment, each man or woman has got one vote. But men are not equal in judgment. Yet popular democracy has everywhere supported the policy of one vote for one man although it vehemently denounces the Socialist advocacy of the policy of one income for every man. The physical needs of an idiot and a man of genius are much less different than the difference in their abilities as voters or rulers of men. Again, in spite of the recent slogan about the dignity of labour talented men invariably tend to rise above the stage of machine-tenders and pass into higher ranks. Thus the real workers are always left without their natural leaders who are absorbed by the other classes. With greater mobility within the modern economic system this process is going on more quickly and more completely than, say, fifty years ago. Moreover, the industrial and commercial system is now organised on a very large scale and is highly complex. It is so delicately balanced that a little upsetting in one part disorganises the whole system and brings disaster to a large number of men including the wage-earners themselves. This makes the leaders of labour, who have little experience of control and direction at higher stages, hesitate a great

deal before attempting violently to grasp the complex machinery the operation of which is unknown to them. Further, business men in modern times have successfully brought about the co-operation of scientists, economists, and inventors with the result that during the last quarter of a century mechanisation and efficiency in production have reached a stage undreamt of before this time. This has considerably increased their reputation as business men and entrenched them in the high opinion of the community. Moreover, business men all over the world have now become fully conscious of the danger to their position, especially after the revolution in Russia. They are very artfully using all the means of propaganda to instil into the minds of men—including manual workers—the great work which they have been doing. This has become so successful and the ways of big business men have become so conciliatory and unobtrusive that for a very long time they may be able to retain their dominant position in the industrial and political life of the country. Their policy of offering an ever-increasing share of the profits of industry to the wage-earners helps them in this endeavour as also confers real benefit upon the workers. Again, there is no doubt that in highly industrialised countries the lot of the manual worker, especially the skilled worker, has



tremendously improved. The amenities of life which are provided for him and the wages which he earns are incomparably greater than what his forbear used to have, even in the preceding generation. This works as a handicap against a workers' revolution for political power. The cry of the Socialist manifesto—"workers, rise, you have only your shackles to lose"—no longer applies to the manual workers of Europe or North America. They have now to lose much more than their shackles, which have receded considerably to the background. This continuous increase in wealth and the standard of living of the workers has made a violent revolution less attractive as a measure of winning political power. Also the need for a social or political revolution is less in those countries now, because of widespread education and technical training, and the breakdown of class distinction, as a result of which a worker can be properly educated and can rise to high positions in the economic hierarchy and to the very highest positions in the political life of the country. This does not mean that the worker has no grievances in those countries. He has many, but on the whole, he, especially the skilled worker, does not think it worth his while to risk what he has got by trying a revolution to redress

his remaining grievances. These grievances centre round the following :

The pay-scale, the basis of remuneration, the amount of and compensation for overtime, the length of the working day, Sunday and holiday labour, full-pay leave, night work, removable hazards to life, limb, or health, sanitary conditions, shop discipline, rules and fines, grounds of discharge, workers' freedom of speech and freedom to organise, recognition of workers' unions by the employers, the closed shop.

It is worthy of note that as a reaction against the class consciousness of the workers the " capitalists " have also, in recent years, become class-conscious and class-loyal. They are much better organised to-day than they used to be even two decades ago.

Although we have been talking of workers as if they form part of one harmonious unit in their struggle with the employers, yet, it will be a mistake to think that there is no conflict within the workers themselves. The workers in any factory always look with hostility upon attempts of encroachment on the part of other workers aspiring for the same jobs. This has happened even in the case of " union " workers, especially at a time of industrial crisis. Also there was

great excitement, almost verging on a conflict, when women first invaded some of the industries for jobs which men had held so long. The conflict between union and non-union workers is perennial, and is being forcibly resolved by compelling all non-union men to be enrolled as members of the union if they intend to participate in the benefits of employment in organised industries. Then there is the conflict, which is also political, between the natives and the immigrants, to be found against Asiatics in the U. S. A., Canada, South Africa, Kenya, and Australia. Under the system of political democracy, there is, of course, no question that the conflict must end in the exclusion of the unwanted immigrants. Within labour itself, there is another conflict which shows no signs of abatement. This is the conflict between the skilled and unskilled workers. The skilled worker understands something of the whole process of industrial organisation and takes pride in his work. He is organised into unions and therefore gets proportionately much better wages and a greater share in other benefits of the industry. His standard of living is higher and the security of tenure of his job is much greater. He is also very jealous of the encroachment of the unskilled worker on whom he looks down in the same manner in which he is looked down upon by the classes superior to him in the industrial

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hierarchy. As a result, the skilled worker is much more lukewarm in his support of a violent revolution than the unskilled worker.

Within the economic fold, there is a conflict of modern times, which can, in general terms, be described as that between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The interest of most ordinary industries and businesses is national. These flourish well under cover, and in order to make high profits at the cost of the consumers, they want to shut out or reduce foreign competition by raising tariff walls. They want protected markets at home, and their government's political influence to secure markets for their products in neutral or backward countries. With the decay of men's faith in the principle of *laissez-faire*, they expect State intervention to advance their cause at home and abroad. Most of the big businesses of every advanced country have successfully obtained this kind of political support from their government. As a result we find a scramble for the State protection of industrial interests as against those of rival foreign industrialists. But there are other types of business which flourish in an atmosphere of cosmopolitanism. High finance is well organised and has an international outlook, both from political and economic motives. The political motive is to create obligations by which a foreign State will be bound to the home country. Thus

arises the rivalry to lend money even to bankrupt countries like Spain after the recent civil war. Turkey and Egypt were at one time thus put under heavy obligations. Most of the foreign capital invested in the Balkan countries has also the political motive behind it. The tactics of high finance go beyond such comparatively innocent measures. Attempts have been made suddenly to organise a rush on foreign investments in a big centre by another State, as happened in London in 1931, and the political pressure of high finance in the U. S. A. upon Britain and France in connection with war debts, in order to compel France to behave better towards Germany and probably to compel Britain to terminate its alliance with Japan. The purely economic effect of high finance abroad has been to enslave the backward countries by securing its stranglehold upon their economic life. Another industry which has a cosmopolitan outlook is the industry of armaments. Modern armaments can be produced by only a few countries on any adequate scale. These are Britain, the U. S. A., Germany, France, Japan, Russia, Italy, and Czecho-Slovakia. But the fighting spirit is wider spread than that in this world. Also armaments become obsolete very soon and there is little opportunity of testing the efficiency of technical improvements unless there is fighting going on somewhere in the world.

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Thus, armaments industries sell to the smaller countries and egg them on to war among themselves for testing the results of industry. The smaller countries are nothing but pawns in this game, for their internecine wars can be stopped easily, if by nothing else, then at least by drying up the flow of armaments.

When war starts between two big countries, it is also, in a sense, an economic conflict between them. Apart from the original causes of such a war, which are mostly economic, the success of the issue is also largely dependent upon the economic resources of the contending parties. The present war has already started to be an economic struggle. The manufacture of modern weapons of war is highly costly, and a war can be carried on only if it is waged on a large scale. It is much more capitalistic than any war before the present century began. The cost of a battleship, aeroplane, tank, heavy bomb, submarine, torpedo is enormous. The consequence is that only very rich and highly industrialised countries can wage war with any hope of success. Great natural resources, unlimited credit, technical knowledge, and industrial skill must be possessed in great abundance before a modern war can be fought. The rich country is superior also in another way. The implements of modern warfare take a long time to produce. Therefore, all the big countries

must always be prepared with full equipment which soon becomes obsolete, and therefore, must be periodically discarded or renewed. That is, in peace times, a huge quantity of national wealth must be invested in war materials, and a huge quantity of the productive resources in men and materials must be directed towards war preparation. None but a very rich country can afford to do this.

Another economic conflict exists in the form of a struggle between what we may term combination and competition. Combination is usually another form of competition, the disorganised and the weak with common economic interests combining together in order to compete more effectively with the stronger rival. But very big combinations of producers have grown rapidly during the last half a century. Their object appears to be to eliminate competition altogether and secure a monopoly in the production or trade of a particular commodity. The economic reasons why they can succeed are mainly three. By the very large scale of production, they can secure a great reduction in the cost of production, which is all for the good of the community. But, it is not their intention to allow the consumers of their product to participate in the lower cost by selling their product at a lower price. Then they can purchase all the materials which they require for

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their industry at the lowest price, for being monopolists and having no rivals they are the only purchasers of such materials. Therefore, they can, so to say, dictate their price of such materials. This also reduces their cost of production. On the other hand, being the only producers of that article they can sell it at the highest price at which the consumers of their product must purchase it or go without it; that is, they can squeeze the consumers and obtain the highest possible price. All these factors increase their profits, either by reducing the cost of their production or by raising the price at which they can sell their product.

The continuous growth of such combinations has been possible for two reasons. As a result of scientific inventions and highly developed methods of business organisation, there has been such a great specialisation in plants and human work, that only the very large industries can take full advantage of such specialisation. If a costly machinery or a highly paid expert is to be engaged full time on a very small portion of the whole work, it can be possible only when the industry is run on a huge scale; so that the total product is so large that such a machine or an expert can be kept engaged for the whole time on a small part of the work. Therefore, in competition, all small-scale industries must disappear, as they

cannot afford to specialise to this extent, and therefore, their cost of production per unit of output remains higher. In this way, we find that the evolution of industrial unit has been in the direction of larger and larger size in business units. As a result, there tends to be now a smaller number of very large industrial units producing one particular article, as contrasted with the situation of fifty years ago, when there used to be a larger number of smaller industrial units producing the same article. This brings into operation the second cause favouring combination. It is always easier to bring about negotiation and agreement among a smaller number than among a larger number. The heads of big business units are more intelligent and more aware of the wider forces affecting their business than heads of smaller units whose vision is necessarily limited within the small market in which they hope to sell their product. When a few large industrial units survive, they know that all of them are strong with huge material resources and very clever men employed by them. Therefore, any attempt on the part of one of them to destroy the others will lead to an economic struggle by cut-throat competition which is likely to prove disastrous to itself. Thus the psychological condition predisposing one to come to terms with one's rivals is brought into existence. If

they persist in competition, there is likely to be disaster for all; in any case, under competition the price at which they must sell will be lower, and the benefit goes out of their hands into those of the consumers of their product. But if they all combine, they can retain to themselves all the benefits that accrue to the industry from the lower cost of production as a result of large-scale production, cheap raw materials, and the high price which they can compel the consumers of their product to pay. In this way, huge combinations of industries and business have grown in modern times. The control of such combinations is in the hands of a few men at the top. Sometimes, the same body of men control several big businesses. Thus, the development in economic organisation has gone on in the direction of larger and larger business units under the control of a smaller number of men at the top, whose control and direction have been more and more complete.

In India, in recent years, a movement, mainly based on sentiment, has grown, which may be said to be a sort of conflict between large and very small industries. This is mainly confined to one industry, *viz.* cotton piecegoods. Hand-spinning and hand-weaving have been advocated widely in order to give employment to peasants who always have a large part of their time without any agricultural work. As a temporary aid, the

policy is commendable. The sentiment behind it is certainly to be admired. But as a permanent policy, it is economically unsound. Hand industry can never compete in producing an article which can be produced by specialised machinery and technical experts. Also, economic prosperity is a function of the production of wealth and the increase in population. If nothing is done about the latter, as nothing is being done in India, the former alone cannot bring about real prosperity, since population always tends to increase faster. This is specially so in India, in spite of the high rate of mortality. Even if by some miracle the present generation can be made ten times richer than they are to-day, the people will be as poor as before in the course of the next generation or so, if the problem of population remains untackled.

TRENDS IN ADAPTATION

We should now turn our attention to the adaptation which is going on in all the cases of conflicts which we have studied, and attempt a brief summary of the trends in such adaptations as revealed in the foregoing study of the various kinds of conflicts. In the case of some conflicts, the trends in adaptation are clear; in others, they are blurred and uncertain; in others again, the conflicts are still going on and are

undecided, and there are no signs as to how they are going to terminate. It is clear that the conflict between the old and the young will end in a mutual adjustment. The old are becoming conscious that they must preserve their physical activity and mental alertness in the race of life. They are being helped by the modern institutions of health, hygiene, and popular literature. The conflict is really a conflict of ideals between the two. The education of the young is more thorough and rapid. Thus, the gulf separating the two is being bridged, and the objective of the two regarding social advancement cannot be much different in future. In the sex conflict, it is also clear that the adjustment is coming in the form of dividing the field of human activity roughly into three parts. The more adventurous and physically strenuous part will be left to man and the softer ones to woman. Between the two there will be a wide field in which both the sexes will have free scope for their activity in healthy rivalry to each other ; woman will win most of the jobs which require patience, sympathy, and quiet persistence for their successful working. In the conflict between the active and leisured classes again, it is clear that leisure in the sense of absence of socially useful work will not be tolerated and the leisured class will be compelled, at least under pressure of public opinion, to be active on behalf

of society in general. In the caste conflict, it is obvious that all rigid distinctions will disappear and there will be greater and more rapid circulation of individuals according to their aptitude, training, and experience for careers in society. The conflict between monarchy and democracy has practically been resolved by the abolition of monarchy in the old sense. Where monarchy remains, it will be vested only with social and sentimental functions, and not with any political power. It is also clear that landlords as an institution will disappear and the fruits of the earth by cultivation will be equitably divided between the State and the actual tiller of the soil. The trend of adjustment appears to be obscure in the case of ownership of urban lands, mines, etc. Except in Russia, everywhere else these are privately owned and have not yet been seriously assaulted.

In the conflict between the urban and the rural population, the issue is still uncertain. The rural people are being educated to a realisation of their power and importance. In the U. S. A. and Russia, agriculturists are becoming organised. A great solvent in this conflict is the rapid means of communication like posts, telegraphs, telephones, radios, cinemas, newspapers and magazines, and quick means of transportation like railways, motor vehicles, aeroplanes, and steamships. The suburban habit is also rapidly spreading beyond

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the suburbs and the townsfolk are being drawn nearer to the rural people. As a result, there is a distinct tendency towards ruralisation of towns and urbanisation of villages. Villages in the West now possess almost all the amenities of town life. The destructive power of modern warfare in every congested area may also have a determining effect upon the final solution of this conflict. The issue in the religious conflict is also uncertain. Two distinct trends appear in the struggle. One is tolerance which is the result of the spread of general education and culture and the unobtrusive ways of practising formal religion on the part of its followers. The other is the complete extinction of the religious sentiment among men, especially among the rising generation. There is also uncertainty in the trend of adaptation in the conflict between labour and capital. Its political implications will be noted in connection with Socialism and industrial parliament. To the extent that this conflict is economic, there is uncertainty about the trend of events. It is realised that highly complex and large industrial concerns benefit the society, the workers, and the consumers in spite of their patent defects, and that their abolition will certainly reduce the scale of wealth production. On the other hand, evils of capitalism naturally tempt the workers to grasp full control over the industries.

There is the third class of conflicts, the trends of which cannot be understood, because the struggle is still going on without revealing any definite signs of the ultimate results. In the race conflict, the whites have won everywhere except, probably, in the Japanese sphere. But this does not assure the final success of the whites for two reasons. The first is the internecine quarrels among the whites themselves. This is bound to recur from time to time. The immense cost in life and wealth and the complete disorganisation of all peacetime activities may be too heavy even for those rich countries to bear without serious demoralisation of their life. The second cause is the steadily falling birth-rate among the whites. In biological evolution, for success, a species must not only throw up the best and conserve them for society, but these best must also propagate widely in order to perpetuate their inheritable qualities in the race. A modern war destroys the best manhood, leaving the coward and the weak behind. Also the best—the most clever, the most energetic, the most adventurous, and the most successful—do not marry in a hurry and propagate their kind but leave the multiplication of the community to the improvident, the unhealthy, and the unscrupulous. In the political conflict between State intervention and Socialism of the extreme type, it is also evident that the issue is as yet

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undecided. The only practical example was Russia for a decade following the revolution in 1917. It was much too bloody, and covered much too short a period, to decide the issue. Now Russia has an unmixed dictatorship which is far away from popular control, and which is indistinguishable from popular dictatorship in Germany, Italy, and Turkey. In fact, the latter is more vigorous, but in these countries there are no signs of the two important characteristics of Socialism. One of these is the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, vesting their ownership in the State. There is, no doubt, more complete State control, but no attempt or even thought of this transfer of ownership is discernible. The other characteristic is the transference of all sovereign powers of the State to the economic organs, culminating in a parliament of industry and the abolition of the present system of political parliament. Dictatorship has practically abolished all parliaments. The struggle will no doubt start elsewhere when there will be a real conflict within the democratic fold, between the political and industrial parliaments, for sovereign power. It appears that there is little scope for a compromise or mutual adjustment in this struggle, since sovereign power must ultimately rest in one of these parliaments, the other, if retained at all, being only a subordinate or advisory body. The

issue is undecided, because industrial parliament has lost—as in Russia, or never obtained—as in Germany, Italy, and Eire—real power, and also because the struggle has not taken real shape in democratic countries. The latter can arise only after the conflict between democracy and dictatorship has been finally settled.

Thus the conflict between the democratic and authoritarian forms of government may be said to have great importance in the immediate future. We have seen how this conflict is really a conflict of a series of other vital factors, and therefore should not be attributed only to transient causes which existed immediately before the advent of the regime of dictators and which paved their way to political power. The final issue, it will bear repetition to say, will depend upon how the other conflicts are decided, *viz.* the conflicts between totalitarianism and individualism, between aggressive nationalism in foreign policy and individual liberty within a country, between parliamentary deliberation and discussion on the one hand, and on the other, quick decision and swift but efficient execution, between strong antagonisms and solidarity of a nation within itself. These are all open questions as yet, and till the trends in these conflicts are definite, the final decision of the conflict between democracy and authoritarianism cannot be within sight. It

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should be noted that this decision cannot come merely as a result of a war such as the present one, in which, in a sense, this conflict also may be said to be involved. The sudden spread of undiluted democracy after the last war did not resolve, but only intensified the conflict. The post-war dictatorship was more thorough, more complete, and more popular than the pre-war dictatorship in Russia, Germany, and Turkey. Also the post-war democracy in the succession States of Europe was less efficient, less tolerant, and less homogeneous than democracy in the older countries like Britain, the U. S. A., France, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, etc. In the social as well as in the physical world, the Newtonian law of action followed by reaction operates, and neither action nor reaction can be said to be an adjustment in the true sense of the word.

This conflict between democracy and authoritarianism will also depend for its solution, to a great extent, upon the economic conflict which we have described as that between competition and combination. This conflict is also undecided and shows as yet no definite trend one way or the other in regard to a final solution. However convenient for scientific study it may be to divide topics into political, economic, etc., man's mind and behaviour are not so separated, but work as one unit. A dominant idea in the human mind, or

a dominant type of behaviour in his political life must have its repercussions in his economic life as well. In the same way, economic life affects also political life and activity. In man's political idea, democracy gives great importance to the individual, and this emphasis is sought to be worked in practice by reforms in the system of voting and election, even in party organisations and government. On the other hand, the economic organisation has been growing with the underlying idea of an opposite type. Here, the increase in the number and size of combinations is making the ordinary individual a more or less passive part of the mechanism, transferring all real power of control, initiative, and direction to a few at the top. In political democracy the idea of the individual's importance is, at least theoretically, dominant, while in economic combinations the oligarchy—it may be the oligarchy of merit—has come to rule. The two ideas are inconsistent and contradictory to each other. Hence there is a conflict. This conflict must also be resolved before the final issue between democracy and authoritarianism in political life can be decided. At present it is undecided. On the one hand, authoritarianism has planned political life on the basis of an oligarchy, but is tempered by popular support. On the other hand, democracy has anchored itself to popular will, but more frequently

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than ever before, resorts to bureaucratic methods of control by the executive power in the form of what is called delegated legislation. Each is being affected by the other. It is undecided whether the one or the other will be completely victorious, or whether there will be a workable compromise as an adjustment. If the latter, no signs of its nature or form can yet be discerned.

It may be interesting to note a few general tendencies in adaptation and the consequent fate of past civilisations. When a conflict arises, forces tend to move towards an adaptation which may take two opposite forms. The immediate result is a contest, and either side attempts to eliminate the other altogether. If this is successfully accomplished, the adaptation takes the form of retention of power by the older, or replacement of the older class or institution by the new one. Such adaptation is by moving from one extreme to the other extreme, a sort of pendulum movement from one end to the other, what the dialectician would call a thesis followed by the antithesis, and the scientist, an action followed by a reaction. A real synthesis arises only if the struggle to the finish is frustrated and the two opposing forces are reconciled in a larger and broader adjustment. Such adjustment may lead to bending, altering, or modifying the social structure according to the nature of the adjustment.

Whether in nature or in society, such an adjustment tends always to take the line of least resistance. The weakest parts of each of the contending sides yield to the other and go down. Normally the weakest parts are also the effete and obsolete parts, since the strong parts may be said to be strong because of general popular support and, therefore, of greater usefulness. This line of argument presumes elasticity and resilience of social structure. In spite of popular belief to the contrary, few social organs can be so inelastic as to be altogether impervious to social requirements, if there has been a definite change in the circumstances making them obsolete. Yet there must be degrees of such elasticity of social institutions, which will affect their capacity to be amenable to changes according to the needs of the changing circumstances. A civilisation which is well advanced develops a complex life, and with it, institutions for all branches of its activities which fit into a harmonious system subserving the main purpose of that civilisation. The greater the advancement of the civilisation, the more intricate and subtle are the institutions which gradually grow in society. In this respect, they correspond to biological evolution. The lowest forms of life are without much organisation within themselves nor is there much specialisation in their organs. But the vertebrate has specialised

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to a great extent and therefore requires a larger number of organs to work its life process. Also, there is a delicate balancing of its specialised organs, all fitting into a harmonious whole, the upsetting of one causing grave disturbance in the functioning of the rest of the organs. The same is also true of institutions forming parts of a civilisation. The growth is by the process of what Herbert Spencer calls differentiation and integration, and what we may now call functional specialisation by growing one separate organ for each function, and dovetailing all organs for the benefit of one another and of the society as a whole. In this way, a social structure grows which serves one type of social evolution which we call a civilisation. But this growth depends upon the physical environment of the particular society as also upon the knowledge and capacity of its members to adjust their institutions to the environment. A civilisation is always the product of a long period of such adjustment and may thus be taken as the most suitable type in the conditions of the time during which it has evolved. These conditions may radically alter as a result of physical or social causes. If they do, an old civilisation finds itself handicapped in the new struggle for existence. Its institutions are meant to serve in a particular environment and for a particular social purpose and they have grown

fully, that is, have become rigid and crystallised. Thus an old civilisation with its well-developed institutions always finds it more difficult to adjust itself to a new environment or a new social purpose than another society which is much less developed, and therefore, not handicapped by stereotyped institutions. It is as if, man, with his present structural growth for living on land, were suddenly asked to live in water. He simply cannot adjust himself and must die out, leaving the field to other species of animals which are less specialised and stereotyped in their organs. Physical and cultural environment may change as suddenly as that by a war or a natural catastrophe, but usually changes more imperceptibly. In the first case, structural rigidity prevents adjustment. In the second case, want of adequate knowledge and of discernment to observe and discover the slow changes and take necessary action accordingly, is equally disastrous. Also a feeling of security and therefore a lack of alertness grow as a result of the past success and of too great a confidence in the resulting institutions. That is why civilisations, like physical organisms, rise, flourish, and die in their time.

It is worthy of note that there has been no case in the history of man when a civilisation which had flourished well and died, has again appeared in a subsequent age with an equally great civilisation. China, Nubia, Egypt, Sumeria,

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Assyria, India, Phoenicia, Crete, Greece, Rome, Iran, Arabia—all failed to adjust their civilisations to the new circumstances and have so far failed to develop again to any position in the cultural life of modern man at all comparable to their position in the past. Of these centres of civilisation, China and India alone have been able to retain a modicum of their past civilisations. This not only speaks a great deal for their past inherent strength but also bespeaks incapacity or unwillingness to alter. In such circumstances, the natural protective outlook is the anti-scientific one, *viz.* that civilisation is a perennial, immutable adjustment which is attained once for all, and is only to be kept intact for ever afterwards. The dynamic aspect of life, of its environment, of its attitude and of its urges, is overlooked. This makes it more difficult for the growth of new and suitable institutions and more dangerous for the very existence of that society. What we are witnessing to-day in China and India is a process of social dissolution which Egypt, Greece, Rome witnessed several centuries ago.

Nor is it easy for such a social system to break up the old order and take to a new one. Greece and Rome have taken to the north European civilisation during the last one hundred years. So are China, India, Egypt, Iran trying to do now. But there is a fundamental difference between

the processes of the past civilisation and the adoption of the new. In the past, when its civilisation was being built up in each of these countries, the process, like the pangs of a new birth, was all its own, compelling it to think, to try, to err, to ponder, and to hesitate before the adjustment. The genius of the people worked slowly and painfully for centuries in order to evolve institutions suitable for, and giving expression to, its cultural ideals. Now it can only borrow what has been successful elsewhere, and in the swift race of modern life, attempts overnight to overhaul its institutions—discarding, breaking, and replacing. Japan appears to reveal some signs of successful adjustment. But Japan's civilisation was less developed and therefore less burdened with stereotyped institutions suitable for a by-gone age. Also Japan's success has been more spectacular than real inasmuch as the masses have not been affected by the rapid changes which have been adopted wholesale from the West. Moreover, in the case of Japan, it is discarding one borrowed civilisation, *viz.* that of China, in favour of another borrowed civilisation, *viz.* that of the West.

In the mean time the old centres of civilisation, or centres of prospective new civilisations, are handicapped in the race by the rapid growth of the means of communication and of destruction

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in the hands of the new civilisation which has been developing in northern Europe during the past three hundred years, and which has since migrated and permanently settled in several other parts of the world. The onslaughts of this Eur-American civilisation do not leave to the other centres any time or opportunity to develop their own civilisation along the lines of their own genius, for their separate existence has been made impossible by the spread of this new civilisation. It is not merely the political and economic life which is being suppressed in these older centres ; what is more, the social and spiritual urges are being superseded or perverted. This is nothing unnatural or exceptional for the Eur-American civilisation. All civilisations have spread thus in the past, limited only by the limits of human capacity to organise, extend, and overwhelm other civilisations. The latest means of communication and of destruction, which have wrought such disaster to the civilisations of the non-white races, must themselves be considered as part of the institutions developed by the new civilisation. Nor can its use of such institutions for overwhelming other civilisations and spreading itself be said to be unprecedented in the history of man. This has always happened in the case of every civilisation, in every country, in all ages, throughout man's history. The means and methods and

instruments have been different but the objective and the result have been the same in all cases of clash of civilisations.

It is not the function of a student of the evolution of human institutions to suggest remedies for an existing social evil or the means of escape from a difficult social situation. There is no apparent remedy nor any immediate means. Real adjustment does not come out of purely theoretical speculation on possibilities, nor does it reveal itself in a flash. It is a gradual process depending upon the peculiar genius of a particular people. It is a slow, painful, and difficult thing to discover that genius, as also the bent of its working in a given situation. To a greater extent than we realise, it is a process of experiment and trial by individual members of a people. Human achievement depends largely upon the spirit of adventure that is innate in the people and it is only by experimenting along different lines in a real spirit of adventure that the genius of a people is revealed and the necessary lines of adjustment indicated. An important means, therefore, is to keep up the spirit of adventure and allow it sufficient scope to work itself untrammelled, as far as possible, by the chains of older institutions on the one hand and the impact of the new civilisation on the other, but not isolated from either of these influences. The spirit of adventure is the spirit of youth and

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it is the youth of the country, no matter whether they are young or old in physical age, upon whom will depend whether the civilisation of their country will be the old and obsolete thing which they may have inherited from the past, or a cheap imitation of the new civilisation which is knocking at their door—nay, knocking about within their doors,—or whether it will be a civilisation which is an organic growth embodying the spontaneous adjustment of the genius of the people and the new environment, conditioned by the changes in the social and physical circumstances of their existence.

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